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Abstract
These lectures are meant to familiarize the audience with some of the funda-
mental results in the theory of implementation and provide a quick progression
to some open questions in the literature.

HSS 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125, home page: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/ jack-
sonm/Jackson.html, email: jacksonm@hss.caltech.edu. This paper provides a written version of lec-
tures given at the NATO Advanced Study Institute on Game Theory and Resource Allocation: The
Axiomatic Approach, which took place at SUNY Stony Brook in July of 1997. I thank the organizers
and especially William Thomson for organizing the institute and the participants for feedback on the
lectures.
1
1 Introduction
There are many economic, social, and political situations where individuals interact
to make decisions that aect them collectively. Examples range from voting to elect
representatives or choose a public policy, to trading in a market. Based on their pref-
erences over the possible outcomes of the interaction, individuals may act strategically
in order to inuence the outcome to their advantage. For instance, in an election a
voter might vote for his or her second ranked candidate if the voter's favorite candidate
has no chance of being elected; or in an auction a buyer may select a bid considering
trade-os between the probability of winning the auction and the price to be paid. The
specic design of the institution through which individuals interact, for instance the
rules of the election or auction, can have a profound impact on the strategic behavior
of the members of the society and on the outcomes of the process. Implementation
theory is a study of the relationship between the structure of the institution through
which individuals interact and the outcome of that interaction.
Game theory plays a central role in the modeling of the strategic interaction studied
in implementation theory. In many applications of game theory, the game modeling
interaction is taken as given and analyzed to predict the actions of individuals and
the resulting outcome. In implementation theory, instead of taking the game as given,
it is something to be designed. Often, one thinks of the desired outcomes as the
given and analyses whether there exist game forms for which the strategic properties
induce individuals to (always) choose actions that lead to the desired outcomes. An
example of an implementation question is: how can we design an auction to be sure
that the individual who most highly values an object is sure to be the winner of the
auction?
1
In this view, implementation theory is a normative branch and game theory
is a positive branch of the same tree, and implementation theory is the design or
reverse engineering process associated with game theory. Of course, this view is a
bit caricatured, but indicates that there is a close relationship between the tools and
understandings developed in implementation theory and game theory.
To get a feeling for the type of questions that are analyzed in implementation theory
let us start by looking at a classic example. Consider a society or committee holding
an election to select one out of a set of candidates. Each member of the society has
a preference ranking over the candidates. The society may have certain aspirations
1
For an analysis of this particular problem from a mechanism design point of view, see Dasgupta
and Maskin (1997). I will discuss the relationship and dierence between mechanism design and
implementation.
2
regarding which candidate should be selected as a function of the preferences of the
members of the society. For instance, it may wish to avoid selecting a candidate who
is Pareto dominated by another candidate (i.e., a candidate ranked lower than another
candidate by all members of society). It may also wish to select a Condorcet winner
(a candidate who defeats any other candidate in a pairwise comparison according to
a majority of voters' preferences) if such a candidate exists. If these were the goals of
the society then the implementation question would be, \Does there exist an election
procedure for which for each possible prole of preference rankings of the voters, each
equilibrium outcome of the election procedure would be Pareto optimal and Condorcet
consistent?"
In order to answer this question one has to make precise what an election procedure
is and what equilibrium outcomes are. This is the point at which game theoretic tools
are used. The election procedure is modeled as a game form or what is commonly
referred to as a mechanism in the literature. It species a set of possible actions or
messages that each member of society can use, and then the outcome (in this case
the candidate elected) as a function of the actions or messages sent by the members
of society. For instance one could have each member of society submit their ranking
of the candidates. If there are m candidates, then one could award a candidate m
points for each voter whose submitted ranking places them highest, m   1 points for
each voter's submitted ranking places them second highest, and so on. The elected
candidate is the one who has the most points, with ties broken according to some
pre-specied rule. This is the mechanism corresponding to Borda's (1781) scoring
method. Of course, it may not be in a society member's best interest to report their
true preference ranking. This is where equilibrium concepts from game theory are
used to make predictions concerning strategic behavior. A solution concept such as
Nash equilibrium can be used to predict the preference rankings that will be reported
by voters as a function of the voters' true preference rankings. Depending on the
class of mechanisms that are admitted (e.g., how complicated we allow the message
spaces to be) and which equilibrium concept that is used, we can end up with dierent
answers concerning the possibility of selecting from the Pareto correspondence and
being Condorcet consistent.
2
2
The Borda scoring mechanism will not satisfy Condorcet consistency. Moreover, as we shall see in
Example 3 there is no Nash implementable social choice correspondence that selects from the Pareto
correspondence and be Concorcet consistent. See Dutta and Sen (1993) and Jackson, Palfrey, and
Srivastava (1994) to nd examples of social choice correspondences that satisfy these properties and
are implementable via backwards induction or undominated Nash equilibrium, respectively.
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In the above example a very concrete question was posed. We asked whether
it was possible to design election procedures that possess specic properties, or in
the language of the theory, whether it is possible to implement correspondences with
specic properties. Also, we focused our attention on a specic setting. While this is
one way to proceed in analyzing implementation, it does not directly
3
provide a general
understanding of implementation that moves across dierent problems. Another way
to proceed, is to take a more abstract approach to the implementation problem and
attempt to fully characterize the class of the correspondences that can be implemented.
That is, we can search for properties that precisely identify which correspondences
are implementable and which are not, and also identify implementing mechanisms.
These properties can then be applied to specic settings to check whether a given
correspondence can be implemented. Such general characterization results have been
produced with remarkably little in terms of assumptions on the structure of the set of
alternatives or the feasible preferences of individuals. As we shall see, the theory has
alternated between fairly general and abstract theorems that cover a wide variety of
potential applications, and more focused and detailed theorems that apply to particular
settings or correspondences.
In what follows, I concentrate on a specic progression in the literature and in doing
so provide a biased view that often reects my own perspective on the literature. These
lectures are meant to be an introduction to the theory rather than a survey,
4
and so
I do this without apology. At points I provide opinions concerning assumptions and
results, which are quite critical. This is meant to constructively point out limitations
of some of the existing results and suggest potential directions for future research.
In what follows I assume that the reader has an introductory level knowledge of
game theory (and thus has seen notions such as Nash equilibrium) and is also familiar
with some concepts from microeconomics such as preference relations and Walrasian
equilibrium.
3
Nevertheless, I will come back to discuss why an approach of cataloging the answers to such
narrower questions may turn out to be a useful approach to developing the theory.
4
Surveys of various aspects of the literature may be found in Moulin (1982), Moore (1992), Palfrey
(1992), Palfrey and Srivastava (1993), Allen (1997), and Corchon (1998). While these lectures are
not meant to survey the literature, the Bibliography that I include here is fairly comprehensive. The
exception is that I do not include references to the large literature related to dominant strategy
implementation as Salvador Barbera (1998) oers lectures on strategy-proofness in this same volume.
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2 Denitions and an Example
Individuals
A nite group of individuals interact. N denotes both the set of individuals and its
cardinality. Generic individuals are represented as i, j, and k.
Outcomes
The set of outcomes is denoted A, and generic elements are represented as a, b, c,
d.
The set of outcomes may be nite or innite depending on the application. For
example, consider the design of a voting procedure to elect one of a nite number of
candidates. In that case, N is the set of voters and A is the nite set of candidates.
As another example, consider the design of a market where individuals interact to
exchange ` dierent goods. In that case N is the set of economic agents, and A  IR
N`
+
represents the nal allocation of goods (including labor, leisure, consumption goods,
etc.) that are possible given the endowments and production possibilities.
Preferences
Individual i's preferences are represented by a binary relation R
i
over A that is
complete and transitive. The notation aR
i
b indicates that i weakly prefers alternative
a to b. The strict preference relation associated with R
i
is denoted P
i
(where aP
i
b if and
only if it is not the case that bR
i
a). The notation R denotes a prole R = (R
1
; : : : ; R
N
),
and (R
 i
; R
i
) denotes the prole where the i-th entry of R is replaced with R
i
.
The set of admissible proles of preferences is the set P. Depending on the applica-
tion, P may impose restrictions on the preferences. For instance, in the context of the
exchange of private goods it may be assumed that preferences are convex, continuous,
and non-decreasing. I will sometimes refer to a prole of preferences as being the state
of the environment.
Social Choice Correspondences
A social choice correspondence, F , maps proles of preferences into subsets of alter-
natives. For any R 2 P, F (R)  A represents the set of socially desirable alternatives
when preferences are given by R. It will be assumed throughout that F is non-empty.
When F is single-valued it is referred to as a social choice function.
In many applications, F will be a well-known correspondence, such as the Wal-
rasian, Lindahl, or top-cycle correspondence, or will be a social choice correspondence
derived from some normative axioms, such as the correspondence of Pareto optimal,
individually rational, and envy-free allocations in a private good exchange setting.
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Generally, implementation theory seeks to characterize the set of social choice cor-
respondences that are obtainable as equilibrium outcomes when individuals interact
through some game form making strategic use of their knowledge of the preference
prole R. There are several perspectives that one can take on this problem. One per-
spective is to begin with a specic correspondence and setting, such as the Walrasian
correspondence in a private-goods economic setting, and ask whether that specic cor-
respondence can be implemented and if so by what mechanism. A second perspective
is to work more abstractly and characterize the set of correspondences that are imple-
mentable, by identifying conditions that they must satisfy. Both of these (and some
other) perspectives have been taken in the literature, and we shall see examples of
each.
Mechanisms
A mechanism is a pair M;g, where M = M
1
     M
N
is a cross product of
message spaces and g : M ! A is an outcome function. Thus, for each prole of
messages m = (m
1
; : : : ;m
N
), g(m) 2 A represents the resulting outcome or allocation.
A mechanism is often also referred to in the literature as a game form. The ter-
minology game form distinguishes it from a game, as the consequence of a prole of
messages (or actions) is an outcome rather than a vector of utility payos. Once the
preferences of the individuals are specied, then a game form induces a game. Since
in the implementation analysis the preferences of individuals vary from state to state,
this distinction between game forms and games is critical.
Solution Concepts
A solution concept
5
species the strategic behavior of individuals faced with a
mechanism (M;g) given a preference prole R. Thus, it is a correspondence S that
identies a subset ofM for any given (M;g;R) specication. For the question of what a
mechanism implements, the specic messages that are predicted by the solution concept
are only of intermediate interest as the corresponding set of outcomes that result is the
important concept. Thus, we pay attention to the outcome correspondence associated
with a solution S represented by O
S
(M;g;R) = fa 2 A j 9m 2 S(M;g;R) s:t: g(m) =
ag.
For example, for any given (M;g;R) a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a prole
5
I use the terminology \solution concept" rather than \equilibrium concept", as some of the con-
cepts employed in the literature (such as single or iterative removal of dominated strategies) do not
make explicit use of \equilibrium" ideas, and can predict vectors of messages that are not stable in
an equilibrium sense.
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m 2 M such that g(m)R
i
g(m
 i
;m
i
) for all i and m
i
2 M
i
. Denote this set by
NE(M;g;R). The set of associated outcomes is O
NE
(M;g;R) = fa 2 A j 9m 2
NE(M;g;R) s:t: g(m) = ag.
I dene other solutions concepts as they arise and similarly defer denitions of
mixed strategies until arise.
Implementation
A social choice correspondence F is implemented by the mechanism (M;g) via the
solution S, if O
S
(M;g;R) = F (R) for all R 2 P . F is said to be implementable via
the solution S if there exists a mechanism (M;g) which implements it.
The above form of implementation is sometimes referred to as full implementation
as it requires the exact coincidence of the outcomes of a mechanism with the social
choice correspondence.
One can also reasonably argue for a weaker form of implementation where one
only requires that O
S
(M;g;R) be a non-empty subset of F (R) for every R.
6
This
takes the point of view that any outcome in F (R) is socially desirable and so any
selection is ne. Note, however, that F is weakly implementable if and only if some
sub-correspondence of F is implementable. The literature has thus proceeded in charac-
terizing what is implementable, which then provides an indirect answer to the question
of weak implementability.
7
One key aspect of implementation (and weak implementation) is the requirement
that all equilibrium outcomes lie in the given social choice correspondence. This is
dierent from designing a mechanism that has one desired outcome as an equilibrium
outcome, as there may also be undesired equilibrium outcomes that are not accounted
for. This points to the important distinction between the \implementation" literature
and the \mechanism design" literature as being one of worrying about multiple equilib-
ria. The mechanism design literature focuses on incentive compatibility issues, asking
whether a given outcome can be induced as an equilibrium of some mechanism and
generally ignores whether there are other equilibria. In situations where this leads to a
negative result (e.g., Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)) showing that certain outcomes
cannot be sustained as the equilibrium of any mechanism this approach is ne. How-
ever, in situations where it leads to positive results so that one identies a mechanism
6
See Thomson (1996) for an argument supporting full implementation over weak.
7
This may not be an entirely satisfactory approach, as there may be conditions for weak imple-
mentability that are easier to verify than checking whether some sub-correspondence satises the
conditions for implementability.
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and one of its equilibrium as satisfying some desired criteria, then one should be very
careful in interpreting the result. Can we be sure that the given equilibrium will be
played and not some other equilibrium of the mechanism?
8
Are there other mecha-
nisms that are better from the perspective of maintaining the desired equilibrium, but
not having other undesired ones? This point is well illustrated in an example of Dem-
ski and Sappington (1984)
9
, where the \optimal" mechanism to a principal-multiple
agent problem has a second equilibrium which makes all the agents better o and the
principal worse o.
10
The multiple equilibrium issue is why the implementation problem is still non-
trivial in environments with complete information, where each individual knows the
other individuals' preferences. As an example, suppose that we consider trying to
implement the Walrasian correspondence in a classical Edgeworth setting. If we only
want to make sure that Walrasian outcomes are Nash equilibrium outcomes, and do not
care about what other equilibrium outcomes may arise, there is a simple mechanism
that works. Individuals simultaneously announce a full vector of feasible allocations. If
they all announce the same vector of allocations then that is the outcome, and otherwise
the outcome is that they each keep their endowment. Clearly everyone announcing the
same Walrasian allocation is a Nash equilibrium of this mechanism. Unfortunately,
there are many other equilibria of this mechanism which are not Walrasian allocations.
The question implementation question is there exists a mechanism whose entire set
of Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of Walrasian allocations for each
preference prole.
On the Timing and Information Structure
Much of the implementation literature uses an idiom that refers to a social planner,
who is benevolent and selects the mechanism to implement a social choice correspon-
dence with a society's best interest at heart. A question that then naturally comes
to mind when thinking about the implementation problem is why doesn't the social
planner adjust the mechanism once the preference prole is realized.
11
Alternatively,
8
If so, why was this not built into the solutoin concept to begin with?
9
For further examples and a pointed discussion of this issue, see Palfrey and Srivastava (1993).
10
A defense that is often oered for focusing a single equilibrium is that society can direct its
members to play the desired equilibrium and then they should have no reason to deviate. This
argument loses some power when there are alternative equilibria that are preferred by some (or even
all) of the members of society, especially if there is any possibility for the members to directly or
indirectly coordinate on an equilibrium.
11
See Baliga, Corchon and Sjostrom (1997) for the possibility of having the planner be a player who
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why do the individuals in society have complete information concerning each others'
preferences (or at least enough information to arrive at an equilibrium) and the social
planner not? An answer is that mechanisms represent institutions (or in some cases
even constitutions), that are meant to be long-lived. These may be costly to adjust, or
it even may be better to commit to xing the institutions not to adjust to the specics
of each realized setting. The rules for a securities market are xed and then traders
arrive with their desired trades, and similarly the rules for an election are (usually)
set before preferences of the voters are realized. Thus, mechanisms can be thought of
as representing institutions, and the implementation problem is to characterize insti-
tutions in terms of the correspondence of outcomes they produce as a function of the
realized state of individual preferences.
Finally, while incomplete information environments, where for instance individu-
als know their own preferences and hold beliefs over the preferences of others, are
arguably more realistic than complete information environments, it has proven use-
ful to attack the problem one piece at a time. Understanding implementation in the
complete information setting has helped signicantly in developing characterizations
of implementation in Bayesian settings.
An Example:
Hurwicz laid much of the foundation of the implementation problem, and presented
a simple example that is a very good one for a rst analysis of some of the issues.
Example 1. (Hurwicz (1972))
Consider a two person, two good exchange economy, that lies in the Edgeworth
box. Individual 1 has an endowment e
1
= (0; 1) and individual 2 has an endowment
e
2
= (1; 0). Let x
i
`
denote individual i's allocation of the `-th good. So here our space
of feasible allocations is A = f(x
1
; x
2
) 2 IR
4
+
j x
1
1
+ x
2
1
= x
1
2
+ x
2
2
= 1g.
Consider two states of the world. In the rst state (R
1
; R
2
), the preference relation
R
i
of each individual is represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function u
i
(x) = x
i
1
x
i
2
.
In the second state, (R
1
; R
2
), the preferences of agent 1, R
1
, are represented by the
utility function u
1
(x) = x
1
2
 
1
1+x
1
1
.
Suppose that we are interested in implementing the Walrasian correspondence.
The unique Walrasian equilibrium allocation at R
1
; R
2
is x
1
= x
2
= (1=2; 1=2), and at
R
1
; R
2
is x
1
= (1=2; 7=9) and x
2
= (1=2; 2=9).
has preferences and can aect the outcome function as part of equilibrium play.
9
Clearly, in either state agent 1 prefers to have the allocation associated with (R
1
; R
2
)
to that associated with (R
1
; R
2
).
12
This is seen in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
There are a few important conclusions to draw from this example. The rst is that
a direct mechanism, or the classic one associated with a \Walrasian auctioneer" who
asks individuals to report their demand functions, will not implement the Walrasian
correspondence. Individual 1 is better o acting as if he had preferences R
1
instead
of R
1
when the state is actually (R
1
; R
2
). This also implies that any sort of incen-
tive compatibility condition will be violated by the Walrasian correspondence (or any
selection from it) when agents' preferences are private information.
Hurwicz points out another consequence of this line of reasoning. A mechanism that
implements
13
the Walrasian correspondence must make use of information of agent 2
concerning the preferences of agent 1, as agent 1 can otherwise pretend to be of type
R
1
. Thus, Hurwicz argues that no \privacy preserving" mechanism can implement the
Walrasian correspondence, where privacy preserving is an appropriate formalization of
the idea that the mechanism only incorporates knowledge of an individual about their
own preferences.
Let us now explore a related question in the context of the same problem in order
to get a better feeling for the implementation problem. We know that a mechanism
that implements the Walrasian correspondence in this example must make some use of
individual 2's knowledge of individual 1's preferences. So we might ask, is that enough?
Is there a simple mechanism that Nash implements the Walrasian correspondence in
this two state example?
The following is the direct mechanism associated with simply asking each individual
to announce their preferences. The rst entry in each row is individual 1's allocation
and the second is individual 2's allocation.
Table 1
12
Hurwicz actually makes a stronger point. Every allocation that is Pareto ecient and individually
rational for both individuals at R
1
; R
2
, is preferred under R
1
(and R
1
) to the Walrasian equilibrium
allocation at R
1
; R
2
.
13
I am being vague about the solution concept at the moment, but the statement is true for most
solutions concepts.
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Individual 2
R
2
Individual 1 R
1
x
1
=(
1
2
;
1
2
), x
2
= (
1
2
;
1
2
)
R
1
x
1
=(
1
2
;
7
9
), x
2
=(
1
2
;
2
9
)
Clearly, there is a unique strictly dominant strategy equilibrium in either state for
individual 1 to say R
1
, and so such a direct mechanism cannot Nash implement the
Walrasian correspondence. This is just an illustration of Hurwicz's point.
Let us now expand individual 2's strategies to include two possible announcements
\Left" and \Right". We will design the mechanism so that it is a strictly dominant
strategy for individual 1 to say R
1
when the state isR
1
, and R
1
when it isR
1
. Moreover,
this can be done so that it is a strict best response for individual 2 to say \Left" if
individual 1 is playing R
1
, and to say \Right" if individual 1 is saying R
1
.
Table 2
Individual 2
Left Right
Individual 1 R
1
x
1
=(
1
2
;
1
2
), x
2
=(
1
2
;
1
2
) x
1
=(
11
18
;
2
3
), x
2
=(
7
18
;
1
3
)
R
1
x
1
=(0; 1), x
2
=(1; 0) x
1
=(
1
2
;
7
9
), x
2
=(
1
2
;
2
9
)
For the mechanism in Table 2, the unique Nash equilibrium in state (R
1
; R
2
) is
(R
1
;Left) which results in the Walrasian allocation for that state, and similarly for
the state (R
1
; R
2
) the unique Nash equilibrium is (R
1
;Right). This mechanism thus
implements the Walrasian correspondence (for this simple two state environment) in
Nash equilibrium. The mechanism also implements the desired correspondence in the
iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies, and most other solution concepts.
As is consistent with Hurwicz's privacy preserving point, it was necessary for us to
have individual 2 play a role even though only 1's preferences vary. One thing to note
about the above mechanism, is that individual 2 does not simply \report" what she
knows about individual 1. Individual 2 would have an incentive to say that it was state
R
1
, even if it was state R
1
. Thus, the agents' incentives in this regard are opposed.
Instead, allowing individual 2 to have a non-trivial message space allows us to create
a richer mechanism; and in particular to exploit switches in individual 1's preferences
11
between the two states. For instance, the \R
1
, Left" entry is one that individual 1
prefers to R
1
, Left" in state R
1
but not in state R
1
. Thus, the o-diagonal entries are
critical to the working of the mechanism and were not chosen by chance. This begins
to hint at an important necessary condition for implementation that I discuss next.
The contrast between the workings of the two mechanisms above points out the
importance of considering a large class of mechanisms for the implementation problem,
and most notably to include mechanisms that do more than simply ask individuals to
report their preferences. Although the mechanism in Table 2 can be regarded as a
direct mechanism if one thinks of asking each individual to report the state, the entries
in the o-diagonals are still critical to successful implementation. Moreover, there are
problems where implementation can only be achieved by mechanisms that are more
complicated. In order to develop a deeper understanding of this, let us now analyze
Nash implementation.
3 Nash Implementation
The seminal work on Nash implementation by Maskin (1977), not only provides us with
an understanding of what is implementable in Nash equilibrium, but it also provides
a blueprint for the techniques and approach that underlie many of the general charac-
terization results in the literature. Thus, it is useful to study Nash implementation in
some detail.
Monotonicity Two Ways
Maskin identied an intuitive necessary condition for Nash implementation that
he called monotonicity.
14
This condition may be expressed in two dierent ways. It
is a trivial exercise to see that the statements are equivalent. Nevertheless, I present
each of them separately as these expressions correspond to dierent expressions in the
implementation problem, and it is useful to emphasize each of these points of view.
Suppose that a social choice correspondence F is Nash implementable. What can
we deduce about F ? Its implementability implies that there exists an implementing
mechanism (M;g). So consider a preference prole R and an alternative a 2 F (R).
Since F is Nash implementable there exists a prole of actions m 2 M such that m
is a Nash equilibrium at R and g(m) = a. Next, suppose that there exists another
preference prole R such that a =2 F (R). The fact that (M;g) Nash implements F
14
This condition previously appeared in the social choice literature under the name strong positive
association (e.g., see Muller and Satterthwaite (1977)). The name monotonicity, however, stuck.
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then implies that m cannot be a Nash equilibrium at R. Thus, there must exist an
agent i and a deviation m
i
that i prefers to m
i
at R
i
. That is, there must exist i and
m
i
such that g(m
 i
;m
i
)P
i
g(m). Since m was a Nash equilibrium at R, it must be that
g(m)R
i
g(m
 i
;m
i
). Letting b = g(m
 i
;m
i
), we have reasoned that F must satisfy the
following condition.
A social choice correspondence F is monotonic if for any R 2 P, R 2 P, and
a 2 F (R) such that a =2 F (R), there exists i and b such that aR
i
b and bP
i
a.
This condition is represented in the following gure.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
In Figure 2, the set of allocations is in IR
2
+
for individual i. The monotonicity
condition states that if a 2 F (R) but a =2 F (R), then there exists some i for whom
either the indierence curves through a corresponding to R
i
and R
i
cross (Figure 2.1)
15
or the upper contour set of R
i
through a is a superset of the upper contour set of R
i
through a (gure 2.2).
We have reasoned the following result.
Theorem 1 [Maskin (1998)] If a social choice correspondence F is Nash implementable,
then F is monotonic.
To get some practice understanding monotonicity, the reader can return to the
implementing mechanism in Example 1 (Table 2) and verify that player 1 and the
o-diagonal entries satisfy the monotonicity conditions that are necessary for imple-
mentation.
To develop a fuller understanding of monotonicity, let us examine the condition
from a dierent, but formally equivalent perspective.
Consider a preference prole R and alternative a 2 F (R). Suppose that
b
R is such
that for each i if aR
i
b, then a
b
R
i
b. This says that a's standing in i's preference ranking
has improved (or at least not fallen) from R to
b
R, so that a is still preferred under
b
R
i
to
each b it was preferred to under R
i
. From Nash implementability we know that there
15
Although in the gure, the indierence curves cross at a, they can cross at any point and may
cross more than once. As noted in Maskin (1998), the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition is
stronger than monotonicity. For a study of the relationship between monotonicity and single crossing
properties see Arya, Glover, and Rajan (1998).
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exists m which is a Nash equilibrium at R. This implies that g(m)R
i
g(m
 i
;
c
m
i
) for any
i and potential
c
m
i
. Given that aR
i
(s)b implies a
b
R
i
b, it must be that g(m)
b
R
i
g(m
 i
;
c
m
i
)
for any i and potential
c
m
i
. Thus, m is also a Nash equilibrium at
b
R and so a 2 F (
b
R).
This leads to the following statement of monotonicity.
A social choice correspondence F is monotonic if for any R, a 2 F (R), and
b
R, such
that for each i and b aR
i
b implies a
b
R
i
b, a 2 F (
b
R).
Thus, monotonicity requires that if a 2 F (R) and for each i the upper contour set
of
b
R
i
through a is a subset of the upper contour set of R
i
through a, then a 2 F (
b
R).
This condition is represented in the following gure.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
One statement of monotonicity follows the reasoning that if an alternative is to
be implemented at one prole but not another, then it must have fallen in someone's
rankings in order to break the Nash equilibrium via some deviation. The other state-
ment of monotonicity follows the reasoning that if an alternative is implemented at one
prole and rises in each individual's rankings at another preference prole, then prole
of actions leading to the alternative which form a Nash equilibrium at the rst prole
must still be a Nash equilibrium prole at the second prole. These conditions are
obviously equivalent as one is simply the contra-positive of the other. Nevertheless, it
is still useful to consider both statements. The rst emphasizes that there must exist
some preference reversal if an equilibrium at one prole is to be broken at another. This
suggests natural relationships with various preference crossing properties. The second
emphasizes that if the standing of an equilibrium alternative improves it must remain
an equilibrium outcome, which is often a useful way of checking whether monotonicity
is satised and provides useful bridges to understanding the connection to conditions
such as strategy-proofness.
Sucient Conditions for Nash Implementation
Monotonicity alone is not a sucient condition for Nash implementation, but it is
sucient together with an auxiliary condition called no-veto power when there are at
least three individuals.
A social choice correspondence F satises no veto power if whenever i, R, and a
are such that aR
j
b for all j 6= i and all b 2 A, then a 2 F (R).
No veto power is a condition that is quite weak in some contexts, such as environ-
ments with some private goods when there are at least three (non-satiated) individuals.
In such a context, each individual would prefer to have more of the private good and so
14
there is never a single alternative that is most preferred by more than one individual.
However, the condition is more restrictive with 2 individuals, or in contexts such as
voting environments where there is no private good.
Theorem 2 [Maskin (1998)] If N  3 a social choice correspondence F satises
monotonicity and no veto power, then it is Nash implementable.
It is instructive to sketch a proof of this theorem,
16
as it provides insight into the
approach used to many of the suciency theorems in the literature.
Generally, it is easy to design a mechanism that has the desired outcomes as Nash
equilibria. It is more dicult to rule out undesired outcomes. To see this, consider
the following trivial mechanism: if at least N   1 individuals name the same alter-
native then that is the outcome, otherwise some arbitrary b is the outcome. Notice
that a unanimous announcement of any a is a Nash equilibrium for any preference
prole. However, every alternative is an equilibrium outcome for such a mechanism
regardless of the preference prole. This points to the importance of the multiple equi-
librium problem. One way to view the mechanism below is to start with such a trivial
mechanism and then modify it using monotonicity to rule out undesired equilibria.
Consider a social choice correspondence F which satises monotonicity and no veto
power and assume that N  3. Consider the following mechanism.
M
i
= P A IN where IN is the set of nonnegative integers.
Dene g as follows:
(1) If m
1
= m
2
=    = m
N
= (R; a; n) and a 2 F (R), then g(m) = a.
(2) If there exists i such that m
j
= (R; a; n) for all j 6= i, where a 2 F (R), and
m
i
= (; b; ) where b 6= a, then g(m) = b if aR
i
b and g(m) = a if bP
i
a,
(3) For any other m label m
i
= (; a
i
; n
i
) and let i

be the lowest indexed i such that
n
i
 n
j
for all j 6= i, and then g(m) = a
i

.
Let us verify that this mechanism Nash implements the desired F . Let R be the
true preference prole.
16
Although the theorem was rst stated in Maskin (1998) (and the manuscript dates to 1977), the
rst proof was by Williams (1986). William's proof required some additional assumptions on the
setting, and the rst complete proof of the theorem as stated is in Saijo (1988). The proof given here
is adapted from Repullo (1987) and Moore and Repullo (1990).
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First, let us check that for any a 2 F (R) it is a Nash equilibrium for all agents to
announce m
i
= (R; a; 0). A unilateral deviation by any i results in an m
 i
;m
i
that
falls either in (1) or (2), and then can only result in a b such that aR
i
b. Thus, no i can
gain by deviating and so m is an equilibrium.
Next, let us check that every Nash equilibrium results in some a 2 F (R). If m is a
Nash equilibrium that falls into (3), then it must be that g(m) is the most preferred
outcome of all agents, since otherwise some agent i could deviate and announce an
integer higher than the other agents and select any outcome a
i
. Thus, by no veto
power it must be that g(m) 2 F (R). If m is a Nash equilibrium that falls into (2),
then any agent j 6= i (where i is as dened in (2)) could unilaterally deviate and choose
an action such that g would be determined by (3) and j = i

(simply by announcing
an integer higher than any other agent and any desired a
j
). Thus, for such an m to
be an equilibrium, it must be that g(m) is most preferred by all agents j 6= i, and
again no veto power ensures that g(m) 2 F (R). Finally, consider the case where
m is a Nash equilibrium and g is determined by (1). If the preference prole R is
announced truthfully, then the outcome must be in F (R). So consider the case where
m
1
= m
2
=    = m
N
= (
e
R; a; n) and a 2 F (
e
R) where
e
R 6= R. Any individual i
could deviate to obtain any b such that a
e
R
i
b (by simply announcing (; b; ) which puts
m
 i
;
f
m
i
under (2)). Thus, it must be that if a
e
R
i
b then aR
i
b. Thus, by monotonicity
a 2 F (R).
This basic structure of this mechanism underlies the construction of mechanisms
in many of the constructive proofs for other solution concepts too. The basic idea is
that there is a possibility for complete agreement which falls under (1). This allows
outcomes in F (R) to be sustained as equilibrium outcomes. As it is possible for the
individuals all to announce the same (R; a; n) even when the state is R and a =2 F (R),
part (2) of the denition of g allows monotonicity to work so that some i can deviate
and announce (R; b; n) and obtain b. Part (3) then allows any individual other than i
to obtain any outcome they like, which rules out equilibria that fall under (2), unless
b is most preferred by all j 6= i in which case by no veto power, b 2 F (R).
As discussed previously, no veto power is not a necessary condition and can be
restrictive. So it is worthwhile to identify a set of conditions that is both necessary
and sucient for Nash implementation. Such conditions have been obtained by Moore
and Repullo (1990). Although these conditions are more complicated, they do provide
additional insight and I refer the reader to the Moore and Repullo (1990) paper for
16
more detail.
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Theorem 2 requires that N  3. The case of N = 2 is of obvious importance
as there are many bilateral interactions that one would like the theory to handle.
Interestingly, there are non-trivial dierences between the case of N = 2 and N 
3. To get a rough idea of the additional considerations that appear for the case of
N = 2, notice that the mechanism used to prove Theorem 2 makes use of the fact
that when N   1 agents announce the same thing, then one can identify an i who is
demanding a dierent alternative as in (2) of the denition of g. With 2 agents this
is not possible and an additional necessary condition appears. Characterizations for
the case of N = 2 appear in Dutta and Sen (1991b) and Moore and Repullo (1990).
While the full characterization is complex, an intuitive sucient condition called the
\non-empty lower intersection condition" appears in Dutta and Sen (1991b), and I
refer the interested reader there for details.
The Restrictiveness of Monotonicity
To better understand what is Nash implementable, let us now explore whether some
well-known social choice correspondences satisfy monotonicity.
Let us begin with the classical exchange environment referred to in Hurwicz (1972)
and consider whether the Walrasian correspondence satises monotonicity. In Example
1 monotonicity was satised. However, that was a very restrictive setting and in fact
monotonicity is not satised by the Walrasian correspondence on the full classic domain
of preferences. This was shown in the context of the following example by Hurwicz,
Maskin, and Postlewaite (1995).
Example 2. (Hurwicz, Maskin, and Postlewaite (1995))
Consider a two person, two good Edgeworth economy.
18
There are two states
(R
1
; R
2
) and (R
1
; R
2
), with the preferences as pictured in Figure 4 below. The alloca-
tion a is a Walrasian equilibrium at R
1
; R
2
, but not at R
1
; R
2
.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
The diculties that appear in the gure above have to do with the boundary of
the Edgeworth box. Thus in order to satisfy monotonicity, we need to nd b such
that aR
1
b and bP
1
a. The allocation b necessary to satisfy this requires an amount of
17
See Danilov (1989) and Yamato (1992) for an elegant full characterization in some specic settings
and Sjostrom (1991) for an algorithm for verifying the necessary and sucient conditions.
18
Although the gure is simply for 2 individuals, it is easily adapted for 3 or more individuals.
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good 2 for player 1 that exceeds the total amount of good 2 available in the economy.
The problem is that the crossing of preferences required by monotonicity takes place
outside of the Edgeworth box, and outside of the set of allocations that are feasible for
a mechanism to provide.
The way around this problem suggested by Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1995)
is to modify the Walrasian correspondence to include a as an equilibrium at R
1
; R
2
.
This new correspondence, called the \constrained Walrasian correspondence" satises
monotonicity and is Nash implementable when there are 3 or more individuals.
To be precise let A = fx 2 R
N`
+
j
P
i
x
i
k

P
i
e
i
k
8kg. Say that x is a constrained
Walrasian equilibrium allocation if there exists p 2 IR
`
+
such that p x
i
 p  e
i
for each
i and xR
i
y for all y 2 A such that p  y
i
 p  e
i
.
The constraint in the denition is in the requirement that y 2 A. In the usual
denition of a demand correspondence, one requires that a demanded point be weakly
preferred to all other points in the budget set. In this constrained denition, it is
only required that a demanded point be weakly preferred to the points in the budget
set that are also feasible given the resources in the economy. Thus, a
1
is not in the
demand correspondence of player 1 at R
1
, but it is in the constrained demand cor-
respondence. So, the allocation a is a constrained Walrasian equilibrium at R
1
; R
2
,
and so the diculty with monotonicity is overcome. Hurwicz, Maskin, and Postlewaite
(1995) show that the constrained Walrasian correspondence is monotonic on a classical
domain of preferences, and it is contained in any upper-hemicontinuous social choice
correspondence that is Pareto ecient, individually rational, and monotonic.
Next, let us examine monotonicity in a voting context.
Example 3.
Let A be a nite set of candidates, and consider the following preference prole.
R
1
= a; b; c, R
2
= c; a; b, and R
3
= b; c; a.
Also consider R
3
= c; b; a.
Let F (R) = fa; b; cg and F (R
 3
; R
3
) = fcg. F agrees exactly with the choice of
most scoring rules (e.g., Borda), and most any rule that is anonymous and neutral (e.g.,
the top cycle correspondence, uncovered correspondence, Copeland rule, Simpson rule,
etc.), as well as plurality rule. Unfortunately, F is not monotonic since the standing of
a has not changed at all in anyone's preference ranking and yet a is in F (R), but not
in F (R
 3
; R
3
).
This means there are no well-known voting correspondences that are Nash im-
18
plementable! This suggests that sequential rationality or other solution concepts are
needed for the implementation of voting correspondences.
To see the restrictiveness of monotonicity in the voting context from another per-
spective, note that the Muller-Satterthwaite (1977) theorem states that in a voting
context
19
if N  3 then any social choice function that is monotonic is necessarily
dictatorial.
As we have seen, although monotonicity can be satised, it is in general a strong
condition. Many interesting and desirable social choice correspondences are not Nash
implementable. In view of this, various alternatives to Nash implementation have been
investigated in detail. One possibility is to use alternative equilibriumconcepts, an idea
we will turn to later. Generally, using stronger equilibrium concepts (i.e., more rened
ones) allows for more things to be implemented. Usually the more dicult challenge
in implementation comes from ruling out undesired equilibrium outcomes, rather than
ensuring that desired outcomes are equilibrium outcomes. Stronger solution concepts
aid in ruling out undesired equilibria. The second possibility that has been explored is
to place additional structure on the set of alternatives and then to require some sort
of approximate, or what has become known as virtual implementation. I discuss this
next.
4 Virtual Implementation
Virtual implementation works under the assumption that if one cannot exactly imple-
ment a desired correspondence, then one should be willing to implement a correspon-
dence that is arbitrarily close to the desired one. In order to dene what is meant by
\close", we need additional structure on the set of alternatives. The way in which this
has been done in the virtual implementation literature is to let A be the set lotteries
over the some primitive set of alternatives. Then we can say that we are implement-
ing something \close" to a desired alternative if we end up with a lottery that places
suciently high probability on the desired alternative.
If we cannot Nash implement a correspondence we can ask whether there is a corre-
spondence suciently close to it, in the lottery sense, that can be Nash implemented.
More pragmatically, if a correspondence is not monotonic, is there a correspondence
close to it that is monotonic? There is no reason to expect that the answer to this
19
A is a nite set and P includes all strict preference orderings on A.
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question should be yes. However, the work on virtual implementation has coupled this
approximation question together with additional conditions. The answer turns out
to be yes if one restricts attention to certain types of correspondences called \ordi-
nal" ones, or if one restricts attention to situations where individuals' preferences have
von Neumann-Morgenstern representations. Both of these additional conditions place
signicant structure on the problem as we shall see and discuss below.
Following with the literature on virtual implementation, let us assume in this section
that there is some underlying set of alternatives A
0
that is nite, and that the set
alternatives A is the set of lotteries on A
0
. More formally, let K denote the number of
alternatives in A
0
. Then A = fx 2 [0; 1]
K
s:t:
P
k
x
k
= 1g:
This structure on the set of alternatives allows us to dene distance among two
elements of A through Euclidean distance. This induces a notion of closeness of social
choice correspondences:
Two social choice correspondences F and H are -close if for every R 2 P there
exists a bijection  : F (R)! H(R) such that ja   (a)j <  for each a 2 F (R).
So, two correspondences are -close if for each preference prole there is a one-to-
one mapping so that each lottery in one correspondence is within  of its corresponding
lottery in the other correspondence. While this may seem like an innocuous denition,
it may be that two lotteries that are  close to each other are not even roughly equivalent
to a society that cares about ex-post realizations. This is a discussion that we will
return to after seeing how this denition is used.
A social choice correspondence F is virtually implementable if there exists a social
choice correspondence G that is -close to F and is Nash implementable.
20
We can now dene the ordinality condition mentioned above.
Given a preference relationR
i
on A, based on the comparison on pure outcomes (i.e.,
lotteries that provide probability 1 to some alternative), there is an induced preference
relation on the set of underlying alternatives A
0
. For any R
i
, denote this preference
relation by R
i
p
. In what follows, assume that R
i
p
is a strict ordering.
21
Let us say that F is ordinal
22
if F (R) = F (R) whenever R
i
p
= R
i
p
for all i.
A preference relation R
i
is monotone if there exists an ordering of A
0
, a
1
; : : : ; a
K
20
One can dene other notions of virtual implementationby substituting some other solution concept
in the place of Nash equilibrium.
21
This simplies the exposition. One can weaken this somewhat, as should be clear in what follows,
although one cannot allow for complete indierence. Details can be found in Abreu and Sen (1991).
22
Ordinal is a bit of a misnomer, as information contained in how preferences vary on A rather than
just on A
0
is not cardinal information in the usual sense of a specic cardinal utility representation.
20
under R
i
p
such that
(i) a
1
P
i
p
a
2
  P
i
p
a
K
, and
(ii) for any x 2 A and y 2 A such that
P
kM
x
k

P
kM
y
k
for any M  K and
x 6= y then xR
i
y.
Thus, R
i
is monotone (not to be confused with monotonic) if a lottery that puts
more weight on more preferred alternatives is preferred to one that puts comparatively
less weight on more preferred alternatives.
Now we are ready to state a result that contains the main insight of the virtual
implementation literature.
Theorem 3 (Matsushima (1988), Abreu and Sen (1991))
 Any ordinal social choice correspondence dened on a domain of monotone pref-
erences is -close to a social choice correspondence that satises monotonicity.
 Any social choice correspondence dened on a domain of von Neumann-Morgenstern
preferences
23
is -close to a social choice correspondence that satises monotonic-
ity.
Let me outline a proof for each of these results, as the ideas are fairly straightfor-
ward. A formal proof, although notationally heavy, can be easily eshed out by the
reader.
First, let
b
c be the lottery that places equal weight
1
K
on every alternative in A
0
. We
construct G as follows. For any a 2 A consider the lottery (1  )a+ 
b
c. Transforming
any lottery to this corresponding lottery we are sure to have an \interior" lottery, or
one that puts weight on each alternative. This mapping denes a G that is -close to F .
The proof is completed by showing that given either of the restrictions, such an interior
G
24
is necessarily monotonic. Consider any R, and R, and (1   )a+ 
b
c 2 G(R) such
that (1 )a+ 
b
c =2 G(R). First let us treat the case where F is ordinal and preferences
are monotone. Since G(R) 6= G(R), it follows from the ordinality of F that we can
23
Here the social choice correspondence is dened on the domain of preferences and not on the
domain of utility functions. If one wants to use the set of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions
as the domain, then the social choice correspondence must be constant across utility functions that
are ane transformations of each other.
24
The reader can check that the following argument is easily adaptable to show that any interior
social choice correspondence is monotonic on these domains.
21
nd i such that R
p
i
6= R
i
p
. So there are alternatives d 2 A
0
and d 2 A
0
such that
dP
i
p
d and dP
i
p
d. From the denition of
b
c, the lottery b = (1   )a + 
b
c +
1
2K
d  
1
2K
d
25
is well-dened and in fact interior. Since preferences are monotone, it follows that
(1   )a+ 
b
c P
i
b and b P
i
(1  ) + 
b
c. Thus, G is monotonic.
For the case where preferences satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, the
proof is quite similar. Note that if G(R) 6= G(R), then there is some i for whom
R
i
6= R
i
. Then, given the linearity of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, we can
nd lotteries e 2 A and e 2 A such that eP
i
e and eP
i
e. This is pictured in the following
gure for the case where A
0
consists of three alternatives.
[insert Figure 5 here]
Letting b = (1  )a+ 
b
c+
1
2K
e 
1
2K
e again fullls the requirements to ensure that G
is monotonic.
In this setting, given that every social choice correspondence satisfying suitable
conditions is close to one that is monotonic, is any such social choice correspondence
virtually implementable? The answer is yes when N  3.
26
One can easily modify the
environment so that no veto power is always satised. Simply take A to be the set
of all lotteries on A
0
, but omitting each pure lottery (that places weight one on some
alternative). Then no veto power is satised trivially, as there is no best lottery for
any individual since with monotone preferences their favorite lottery is a pure lottery.
The above theorem then leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Matsushima (1988), Abreu and Sen (1991)) Let N  3. Any ordinal
social choice correspondence dened on a domain of monotone preferences is virtu-
ally implementable. Any social choice correspondence dened on a domain of von
Neumann-Morgenstern monotone preferences is virtually implementable.
While virtual implementation provides for a remarkable conclusion, it comes at the
expense of strong assumptions.
First, in considering virtual implementation, one is implicitly assuming that so-
ciety is willing to settle for implementing something that is -close to the desired
25
Here d and d represent the lotteries given weight one to d and d. These convex combinations can
be made directly as A is a Euclidean simplex.
26
For the case of N = 2 one needs to add a non-empty lower intersection condition which corresponds
to the extra condition needed for two-person Nash implementation. Details appear in Abreu and Sen
(1991).
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social choice correspondence . This raises the question of the ex-post rationality of
virtual implementation.
27
Virtual implementation requires that we play with small
probabilities on lotteries that may have nothing to do with the desired social choice
correspondence, but can be used to distinguish preferences (the d's and e's in the above
proof). In particular, with small probabilities these may turn out to be the outcome of
the mechanism. In order for the virtual implementation arguments to be valid, agents
must take these small probabilities seriously and base decisions on them, with full ex-
pectations that these outcomes will be enforced if they happen to be selected by the
lottery. It is perfectly possible that an outcome which is bad for all agents is randomly
selected, and the arguments underlying virtual implementation require that the agents
cannot change this outcome (for example, by renegotiating to some other outcome).
Second, the assumptions of ordinality or of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences
are strong ones and critical to the arguments. Von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences
are assumed in many economics models because of their nice linearity with respect to
probabilities, which allows for a very tractable analysis. However, we should always
be cautious in interpreting results that rely critically on that linearity, rather than
just using it for tractability. In other words, if our results are robust to variations
in the set of preferences then working with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences for
tractability's sake is ne. However, if the results depend in a special way on a restriction
to the domain of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, then we should be cautious in
applying the results. Arguably, virtual implementation relies critically on the linearity
(or ordinality
28
) of preferences because it implies that the crossing conditions needed
for monotonicity will be satised at all interior points! Once one allows for slight
amounts of non-linearity in preferences over lotteries, then the crossing conditions are
not automatically satised, and monotonicity once again becomes restrictive.
27
Many mechanisms for implementation can be criticized for the same reason. This applies to the
mechanisms for subgame perfect and undominated Nash implementation presented in Section 6, and
is something I discuss in more detail in Section 7.
28
Ordinality coupled with the monotone preference condition plays a similar role to the linearity.
If F (R) 6= F (R), then some agent's preferences must dier over at least two underlying alternatives
in A
0
. Then at any interior lottery there must be a crossing of this agent's indierence curves, as
substituting a slight amount of one of these two underlying alternatives for the other will be ranked
in opposite ways by the two preferences.
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5 Renements
Another avenue in the theory is implementation under various renements of Nash
equilibrium.
29
As we saw in the Nash implementation theorems, it is easy to ensure
that a given desired outcome is an equilibrium outcome while it is dicult to rule
out undesired equilibria. This is where the necessity of the monotonicity condition
arises and what limits our ability to implement. Looking at renements helps in ruling
out undesired equilibria and leads to more permissive results. However, with such
additional power will come some cautions about how the renements are exploited.
Let us begin with a discussion of implementation in undominated Nash equilibrium,
as was rst explored by Palfrey and Srivastava (1991). This is a simple and natural
renement of Nash equilibrium, that adds to Nash equilibrium the requirement that
no individual play a weakly dominated strategy.
30
This solution concept is also useful
for illustrating the power of implementation via a renement of Nash implementation,
and some of the cautions that go along with it.
Given a mechanism (M;g), an individual i, and a preference relation for i, R
i
, a
message m
i
2M
i
is weakly dominated by m
i
2M
i
at R
i
if g(m
i
;m
 i
)R
i
g(m
i
;m
 i
) for
all m
 i
2 M
 i
and g(m
i
;m
 i
)P
i
g(m
i
;m
 i
) for some m
 i
2 M
 i
. A message m
i
2 M
i
is undominated at R
i
if there is no other message which weakly dominates it. Let
UD(M;g;R) = fm j m
i
is undominated at R
i
8ig:
A prole of messages m 2M is an undominated Nash equilibrium of (M;g) at R 2 P if
m 2 NE(M;g;R)\UD(M;g;R). So let UNE(M;g;R) = NE(M;g;R)\UD(M;g;R).
The denition of undominated Nash implementation is then that F (R) = O
UNE
(M;g;R)
for all R 2 P.
In order to keep the discussion of undominated Nash implementation relatively
uncluttered, let us impose the following assumption on the domain of preferences. A
29
When I use the word renements, I use it literally to mean a solution concept which always se-
lects a subset of Nash equilibria, such as undominated Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium,
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, strong equilibrium, and trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Imple-
mentation in other solution concepts that are not renements of Nash equilibrium, such as protective
equilibrium or iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies also appear in the literature (e.g.,
Barbera and Dutta (1982) and Abreu and Matsushima (1994)), but are not discussed here.
30
Such equilibria are a superset of trembling hand perfect equilibria (except for N = 2 where they
coincide, see van Damme (1987)), and thus have nice existence properties, but also have the advantage
being easier to dene and work with in such abstract environments as arise in the implementation
literature.
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slightly weaker value distinction condition appears in Palfrey and Srivastava (1991),
and the reader is referred there for details. This condition allows us to provide a unied
exposition of a number of results.
Strict Value Distinction The domain P satises strict value distinction if for every
R 2 P and R 2 P with R 6= R:
(I) For all i, there exists a 2 A and b 2 A such that aP
i
b,
(II) For all i, if R 6= R
i
there exists a 2 A and b 2 A such that aP
i
b and bP
i
a.
(I) simply rules out complete indierence, and (II) says that if an individual's
preferences change, then they change in a non-trivial way so that some alternatives
switch ranking (rather than just becoming indierent). This preference restriction is
satised on a domain of strict preferences (linear orders), but is also satised in settings
where preferences are upper-semi continuous and locally non-satiated
31
and so applies
to almost any setting of interest.
Theorem 4 (Palfrey and Srivastava (1991)) If N  3 and strict value distinction is
satised, then any social choice correspondence that satises no veto power is imple-
mentable in undominated Nash equilibrium.
The contrast of this theorem with Theorem 2 is dramatic, as any social choice
correspondence in economic settings as well as most voting rules are admitted. The
renement to undominated Nash equilibrium has thus made a big dierence in which
social choice correspondences are implementable, completely eliminating the necessity
of monotonicity. The main intuition is that any switch in preferences (one is guaranteed
to exist by value distinction) can be used to change the set of strategies that are
undominated from one state to another. The central diculty in Nash implementation
that is handled by the monotonicity condition is that there can be an alternative a
that one wants to be a Nash equilibrium outcome in one state but not in another state.
So one needs a preference reversal between a and some other alternative b that can be
obtained through a deviation. When one considers undominated Nash implementation,
one instead needs a to be supported as an undominated Nash equilibrium outcome
in one state R but not in another R. Let m be an undominated Nash equilibrium
message prole at R of some mechanism. In order to rule m out as an undominated
Nash equilibrium at R, it must be that either m is no longer a Nash equilibrium or
31
See Jackson (1992) for a proof.
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some m
i
is weakly dominated at R
i
(while it was undominated at R
i
). One can assure
that m
i
is weakly dominated at R
i
and not at R
i
, simply by taking advantage of any
dierence in the preferences between R
i
and R
i
. Of course, one has to be careful in
working out the details so that such dierences are accounted for in each state while
still producing the desired undominated Nash equilibria in each state, which results in
a complex mechanism.
The idea that domination arguments can take advantage of relatively slight dier-
ences in preferences,
32
can be pushed further. In fact an even more permissive theorem
holds with a weaker solution concept. We can drop no veto power, weaken the solution
concept to undominated strategies, and include the case of N = 2.
Theorem 5 (Jackson (1992)) If strict value distinction is satised, then any social
choice correspondence is implementable in undominated strategies.
The proof of each of these theorems involves mechanisms that are quite intricate.
The underlying principles are similar to that of the mechanism used to prove Theorem
2: if there is agreement in the announcements then the outcome is implemented (as in
(1) in the mechanism proving Theorem 2), there is a possibility for some individuals to
deviate and allow for some \test" pair of alternatives which serve the role of changing
which strategies are weakly dominated, and there is some use of an integer game (as in
(3)) to rule out certain undesired congurations of strategies. However, the mechanisms
are more complex in terms of how and when the test pairs apply in order to take
advantage of weak dominance arguments. Rather than exhaust the reader with the
details of the mechanisms, I present a simple example that illustrates an implementing
mechanism for Theorem 5 in a specic case. The example is also useful for another
purpose: it points out a serious caveat that we should have regarding implementing
mechanisms.
Example 4. (Jackson (1992))
Let N = 2 and A = fa; bg. R
1
= R
2
is such that aP
i
b, and R
1
is such that bP
1
a.
Consider F (R
1
; R
2
) = fbg and F (R
1
; R
2
) = fag. This is a peculiar social choice
correspondence as it goes exactly against the preferences of the agents. But it is then
convincing
33
that if we can implement this social choice correspondence then we can
implement any social choice correspondence . The following mechanism does the trick.
32
You may notice some analogies to way in which slight dierences in preferences over lotteries are
expoited by virtual implementation. The same criticisms regarding the ex-post rationality of enforcing
the outcomes can be made, and I discuss this in more detail below.
33
The hard-to-convince reader is referred to Jackson (1992) for the proof of Theorem 5.
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f
m
2
c
m
2
m
1
b a a a a    a a a a a   
b a a a a    b b b b b   
b b a a a    b b b b b   
b b b a a    b b b b b   
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
m
1
a b b b b : : : b b b b b : : :
a a a a a : : : a b b b b : : :
a a a a a : : : a a b b b : : :
a a a a a : : : a a a b b : : :
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
In this table, the    and
.
.
. indicate a countable continuation of the series of entries
and corresponding strategies.
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Let us check that the mechanism implements the stated
social choice correspondence . First,m
2
is undominated for 2 since it is the only strategy
that results in a against m
1
. Second, any strategy in the right half of the mechanism
for individual 2 is dominated by individual 2's strategy
f
m
2
. Next,
f
m
2
is dominated
by
c
m
2
. Next,
c
m
2
is dominated by the strategy immediately to its right; and so forth.
This leaves m
2
as the only undominated strategy for individual 2. A similar analysis
for player 1 leads to a unique undominated strategy of m
1
at R
1
, and of m
1
at R
1
.
Thus, the mechanism implements the stated F .
The elimination of dominated strategies is a questionable practice in the above
mechanism. For instance, in the sequence
f
m
2
,
c
m
2
, : : :, each strategy is eliminated
by the next, but there is no undominated or `best' strategy in that string. We end
up predicting that individual 2 will not play any of these strategies, but will play
m
2
instead, even though it does worse in some situations than any of the eliminated
strategies.
35
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Each individual here has a message set that is divided into two sets that are both countably
innite. So for instance, m
2
gets b against every message in 1's rst set and a against every message
in 1's second set.
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As an aside, the use of the integer game in the mechanism used for Nash implementation (i.e.,
proving Theorem 2) may have bothered you. As no domination arguments were used there, the issues
are slightly dierent than that in Example 4. However, the integer game used in proving Theorem
2 had a similar feature in that it could produce situations where agents have no best response (i.e.,
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As shown in Jackson (1992) this is not simply a problem when dealing with im-
plementation in undominated strategies, but also holds for undominated Nash imple-
mentation. This example can be modied to have three individuals and implement
essentially the same social choice function in undominated Nash equilibrium, via a
mechanism with similar diculties. Moreover, in each of the examples the same is true
of every implementing mechanism.
To address the questionable removal of dominated strategies in Example 4, we can
rule out the use of such mechanisms by requiring that the implementing mechanism be
bounded. This requires that when a strategy is dominated, it be dominated by some
undominated strategy.
36
Bounded Mechanisms
A mechanism (M;g) is bounded relative to P if for every i and R 2 P , whenever
m
i
2 M
i
is dominated at R
i
, then it is dominated by some message m
i
2 M
i
that is
undominated at R
i
.
This denition makes reference to the preference domain, and so boundedness is
a condition relative to an environment. A nite mechanism is bounded regardless
of the environment due to the transitivity of the domination relation. However, an
innite mechanism's boundedness property may depend on the domain of preferences
in question.
If we require implementation via a bounded mechanism, then Theorem 5 no longer
holds and necessary conditions arise.
F is strategy-resistant if for all i, R 2 P and R
i
such that (R
i
; R
 i
) 2 P and for
each b 2 F (R
i
; R
 i
), there exists a 2 F (R) (possibly a = b) such that aR
i
b.
This condition has a avor of strategy-proofness, but as dened for correspondences.
If we think of i at R, considering a manipulation by acting in accordance with R
i
, we
nd that for whatever outcome i may hope for b 2 F (R
i
; R
 i
), there is some outcome
a 2 F (R) which is at least as good as b. This condition is very strong: it reduces to
strategy-proofness when F is a function.
The following theorem illustrates the impact of requiring boundedness in imple-
mentation via undominated strategies.
if they have beliefs that have positive probability that some other individual will use any integer). I
will return to discuss this issue after discussing the domination issues.
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An alternative approach,would be to modify the concept of domination so weakly dominated
strategies are eliminated only if they are dominated by some undominated strategy. (Timothy Van
Zandt suggested this alternative approach in a discussion of Jackson (1992).) As is easily seen from
the proof of Theorem 6, the same restrictions on implementation ensue with either approach.
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Theorem 6 (Jackson (1992)) If a social choice correspondence is implementable in
undominated strategies via a bounded mechanism, then it is strategy-resistant.
The proof of this theorem is quite easy. Let F be implemented in undominated
strategies via the bounded mechanism (M;g). Consider i, R 2 P and R
i
such that
(R
i
; R
 i
) 2 P and consider any b 2 F (R
i
; R
 i
). Since F is implemented, there exists
m 2 UD(M;g;R
i
; R
 i
) such that g(m) = b. Either b 2 F (R), in which case let
a = b, or it must be that m
i
is dominated by some
f
m
i
that is undominated at R
i
. Let
a = g(
f
m
i
;m
 i
). Since (
f
m
i
;m
 i
) is undominated at R, it follows that a 2 F (R), and
from the denition of domination, it follows that that aR
i
b.
Thus, we end up with a stark contrast between what is implementable in undomi-
nated strategies when we can use any mechanism and when we can only use bounded
mechanisms. This suggests it is very important to understand the restrictions imposed
by considering only mechanisms for which a given solution concept is appropriate.
Boundedness ends up restricting the class of social choice correspondences that are
implementable in undominated Nash equilibrium as well. That is studied in Jack-
son, Palfrey, and Srivastava (1994). It turns out to introduce a necessary condition
(the chained condition) that is weaker than monotonicity and strategy-resistance, but
nonetheless rules out some well-known correspondences. The reader is referred to that
paper for details.
While boundedness is a condition that is natural to require when we examine elimi-
nation of dominated strategies, or solution concepts like undominated Nash equilibrium
or iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, it is not an obvious condition
to require when considering Nash equilibrium, or subgame perfect equilibrium, where
the elimination of dominated strategies is never an issue. However, there are condi-
tions that one might like to impose on mechanisms so that such solution concepts are
reasonable.
Mixed Strategies
The denition of Nash equilibrium that we worked with in proving Theorem 2,
does not consider mixed strategies. Even giving a proper denition of mixed strategy
equilibrium requires additional structure as preferences have to be dened over lotteries
on alternatives, and since message spaces may be uncountably innite one has to take
care. Without tackling these technical issues, let us consider an example that shows
that worrying about the possibility of mixed-strategy equilibria makes a dierence.
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What we can show is that if one Nash implements a social choice correspondence by
a nite mechanism, then there may still exist mixed strategy Nash equilibria that result
in outcomes outside of the social choice correspondence and which may be preferable
from the individuals' perspectives.
Example 5. (Jackson (1992))
Let N = 2 and A = fa; b; c; dg. Preferences are described by aP
1
bP
1
cI
1
d (where
I
1
indicates indierence), aP
2
bP
2
cP
2
d and bP
2
aP
2
cI
2
d.
Consider F such that F (R
1
; R
2
) = fag and F (R
1
; R
2
) = fdg. F is Nash imple-
mented by the following mechanism.
m
2
c
m
2
f
m
2
m
1
d c c
c
m
1
d a b
f
m
1
d b a
Note however, that at (R
1
; R
2
) for most denitions of preferences over lotteries,
there also exists a mixed strategy equilibrium that results in a and b with positive
probability. This is true for every nite implementing mechanism.
Claim 1. Suppose that players' preferences over lotteries on A are continuous, convex,
and monotone. Any mechanism with a nite number of strategies for each player has a
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies at R
1
; R
2
resulting in outcomes a or b with positive
probability, and which strictly Pareto dominates the outcome d.
The proof of the claim is simple. Suppose that a mechanism (M;g) Nash implements
F . Consider
c
M
i
 M
i
such that
c
m
i
2
c
M
i
implies that there exists
c
m
 i
such that
g(
c
m) 2 fa; bg. Thus,
c
M
i
is found by eliminating strategies that can only ever lead
to c or d. Since F is implemented, there must be some strategy prole
c
m such that
g(
c
m) = a, and so
c
M is non-empty. Given the assumptions on preferences and the
niteness of the mechanism, there exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies to
(
c
M;g) at R
1
; R
2
. Given the denition of
c
M and the fact that preferences on lotteries
are monotone, it follows that this equilibriummust put positive probability on at least
one of the outcomes a and b, as these are reachable by some strategy of 1 given any
(mixed) strategy of 2, and are preferred by 1 to c and d over which 1 is indierent.
Note that
c
m is then also a Nash equilibrium of (M;g) at R
1
; R
2
since strategies in
M
i
n
c
M
i
only lead to c or d and cannot provide improving deviations. This establishes
the claim.
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The above claim shows that the standard denition of Nash implementation that
only considers pure strategies can be a problematic one. Let me make two remarks
about the above example.
First, the social choice correspondence that is being implemented is a bit strange
in that we are trying to implement d when it is a least preferred outcome for both
of the individuals. However, this might be quite natural in the context of a problem
such as a principal/multiple-agent problem, where the two individuals above represent
the agents and the principal designs the mechanism and prefers that the agents take
actions leading to outcome a in the rst state and d in the second state.
Second, the niteness of the mechanism is critical to the result. If we allowed for
innite mechanisms, then we could ensure that there are no mixed strategy equilibria,
by employing an integer game.
37
Maskin (1999) shows that one can design a mechanism
for Nash implementation that has no mixed strategy equilibria (see the appendix of his
article); but his mechanism involves an integer game and thus an innite message space.
This example shows that there are correspondences in nite settings that are Nash
implementable when one only considers pure strategies, but not Nash implementable
(except by innite mechanisms) when one allows for mixed strategies.
For this example, it is natural to require nite mechanisms as the setting is com-
pletely nite. However, many settings of interest are naturally innite and so requiring
implementation in nite mechanisms might not always make sense. So one might ask
what the correct restriction on mechanisms is for Nash implementation if one accounts
for mixed strategies. What is bothersome about integer games is that although there
is no Nash equilibrium to them, players could very well try to announce higher integers
than others in the hopes that they will get their most-preferred alternative. We have
no prediction for how a player will act if he or she believed that the other players would
be announcing integers. A player's best response correspondence is not well-dened
when that player faces a mixed strategy of the others that places weight on an in-
nite set of integers. So, one way to rule this out is to look only at mechanisms for
which best response correspondences are well-dened. Jackson, Palfrey, and Srivastava
(1994) suggest such a requirement, calling it the \best response property." The best
response property is satised by any nite mechanism and also by many innite mech-
37
We saw such a construction in the mechanism used to prove Theorem 2. Under (3), the outcome
was that announced by the agent who named the highest integer. Clearly as long as there is some
disagreement over most preferred outcomes, then there is no equilibrium in (pure or) mixed strategies
to the integer game.
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anisms. Nevertheless, it is a strong condition and rules out some mechanisms that are
well-behaved in the way that they either admit or rule out mixed strategy equilibria.
The same point regarding mixed strategies in this example that was made in Claim
1 above, can be made with regards to subgame perfect implementation.
38
Claim 2. Suppose that players' preferences over lotteries on A are continuous, convex,
and monotone. Any extensive form mechanism
39
that has a nite number of terminal
nodes and that implements F , has a subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies
at R
1
; R
2
which results in outcomes a or b with positive probability and which strictly
Pareto dominates the outcome d.
The proof of Claim 2 is similar to that of Claim 1. We rst need to trim the tree
to obtain a game form like (
c
M;g) in the previous proof. In the extensive form this is a
bit trickier, but the niteness allows us to do this inductively. Start with information
sets that only precede terminal nodes, and eliminate actions that only lead to c or d
at those information sets. If all actions are eliminated, the replace the information
set with terminal nodes that lead to d. Next, proceed to information sets that lead
to either terminal nodes or information sets considered in the rst step, and perform
the same trimming. Proceed inductively until the root is reached. Find a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the remaining extensive form. It must lead to a or b with positive
probability. Then construct a subgame perfect equilibrium of the original game form
leading to the same outcomes, by picking any action at information sets that were
completely eliminated in the trimming procedure. This then establishes the claim.
The diculties with mixed strategies pointed out in the claims above, can be at-
tacked from dierent directions. One approach to handling this problem is to examine
virtual implementation to see if the diculties can be avoided there. Abreu and Mat-
sushima (1992a) have analyzed virtual implementation via the iterative elimination of
strictly dominated strategies. Since the set of Nash equilibria (pure or mixed) has
support in the set of strategies that survives the iterative elimination of strictly domi-
nated strategies, if one obtains a unique prole of actions via the iterative elimination
38
Moore and Repullo (1988) provide a mechanism for subgame perfect implementation that has no
mixed strategy equilibria. However their mechanism also employs an integer game and fails the best
response property.
39
The denition of extensive form mechanism is the same as that of an extensive form game, except
that there is an outcome associated with each terminal node rather than a payo. As the denition
is standard, available in most any game theory text, and notationally cumbersome, I omit it here.
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of strictly dominated strategies, then there must be a unique Nash equilibrium (even
considering mixed strategies). Abreu and Matsushima show that with three or more
individuals, any social choice function is virtually implementable in iteratively un-
dominated strategies by a nite mechanism. Their construction of an implementing
mechanism is very clever and quite intuitive. I refer the reader to their paper for de-
tails. While they obtain a powerful result handling mixed strategies, it comes at the
expense of the strength of the assumptions in the virtual implementation setting (as
discussed above).
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6 Specic Environments
Another approach to accounting for mixed strategies, and also to providing implemen-
tation by mechanisms that are bounded/and or simple and natural in other ways, is to
examine implementation in specic environments. Part of the reason that the mech-
anisms used in the suciency theorems are so abstract and complicated is that they
implement a given social choice correspondence without using any detailed information
about the specic restrictions on preferences that may be satised in an environment.
If we take advantage of knowledge about the structure of the environment, the imple-
mentation problem can be simplied.
One important class of environments to be considered is that of economic environ-
ments where there is a private good. In such environments there is a disagreement
between agents' preferences that avoids problems associated with unanimity - each
agent prefers to have more of the private good. Also, there is some possibility of im-
posing \nes" or punishments that are agent specic. Let us examine two results on
implementation in such settings that employ simple and intuitive mechanisms that are
bounded and handle mixed strategies. The rst such result applies to undominated
Nash implementation and environments that are called separable.
Separable Environments
(1) there exists w 2 A such that aP
i
w for all i, R 2 P, and a 2 F (R),
(2) for any a 2 A, J  N , and R 2 P, there exists a
J
such that a
J
I
i
w for any i 2 J
and a
J
I
i
a for i =2 J ,
40
Glazer and Rosenthal (1992) criticize the Abreu and Matsushima mechanisms on complexity
grounds and Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) oer a reply.
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(3) R
i
6= R
i
implies that there exist a and b such that aP
i
bP
i
w and bP
i
aP
i
w.
(1) is a requirement that there is an outcome that each agent considers to be
worse than any alternative in the range of the social choice correspondence . (This
means that the denition of a separable environment is relative to a given social choice
correspondence .) For instance, in an exchange economy this would be satised by
setting w to be the 0 allocation, provided the social choice correspondence leaves each
agent with some minimal consumption in every state. (2) is the requirement that
captures the separable nature of the environment. It states that it is possible to
reduce the allocations of some set of individuals J while not aecting the remaining
individuals. This is satised in exchange economies that satisfy free disposal, as well
as other settings such as those with public goods and/or externalities provided there
is at least one disposable private good that agents value suciently. (3) is a version
of strict value distinction again, with the additional requirement that the test pair of
alternatives (a and b) be preferred to the bad outcome. Again, it is satised in many
economic settings.
Theorem 7 (Jackson, Palfrey, and Srivastava (1994), Sjostrom (1994)
41
) If the en-
vironment is separable relative to a social choice function F , then F is implementable
in undominated Nash equilibrium by a bounded mechanism that has no mixed strategy
equilibria.
Theorem 7 is proven using the following mechanism.
Each individual i announces either a pair of preference relations m
i
= (R
i
; R
i+1
)
(interpreted as being an announcement i and i + 1's preferences respectively, letting
N + 1 = 1), or a pair of alternatives m
i
= (a; b). There are three cases to consider.
(I) All individuals announce pairs of preferences. In this case, let J be the set of i
such thatm
i
2
= m
i+1
1
. This is the set of iwhose announcement about i+1 matched
what i+ 1 announced about him or herself. The outcome is then [F (m
2
)]
J
.
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(II) Some i announces m
i
= (R
i
; R
i+1
) and all other j 6= i announce m
j
= (a; b)
such that aR
i
w and bR
i
w (with all j 6= i announcing the same (a; b)). Then
g(m) = a
N i
if aR
i
b and g(m) = b
N i
otherwise.
41
The denition of separable environments is from Jackson, Palfrey, and Srivastava (1994). Although
Sjostrom's (1994) setting is slightly dierent, the intuition behind his mechanism is identical.
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So this is the outcome where individuals in J get F evaluated at the R corresponding to that in
the second entry of each agent's message (what they announced about their neighbor), and individuals
outside of J get an outcome equivalent to the bad outcome w.
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(III) For any other conguration of messages g(m) = w.
Since an individual's announcement about his or her preferences can only aect his
or her allocation in (II), it is clear that the only undominated announcement of prefer-
ences is to announce one's own preference truthfully. Also, since by announcing a pair
of alternatives one always obtains an alternative equivalent to w, any announcement of
a pair of alternatives is dominated by a truthful announcement of preferences. Finally,
given that all individuals should be announcing pairs of preferences, and announcing
their own truthfully, it then follows from (I) that each individual should announce
their neighbor's preference truthfully. This is the unique undominated Nash equilib-
rium. The mechanism is bounded because the dominated actions were dominated by
undominated actions.
Thus, in this separable class of environments we can obtain a strong implementation
result with a relatively simple bounded mechanism. Before discussing some of the
shortcomings of the mechanism above, let me discuss a closely related setting and
mechanism for implementation in subgame perfect equilibrium.
A special case of separable environments is that of quasi-linear preferences. That
setting allows for a simple, clean, and intuitive implementation in subgame perfect
equilibrium.
Let us say that an environment has quasi-linear preferences that are representable
by bounded utility functions if there exists A
0
such that
(1) A = f(a; t
1
; : : : ; t
N
) 2 A
0
 IR
N
j
P
i
t
i
 0g, and
(2) each R
i
is represented by a utility function u
i
: A
0
! [0; 1] such that (a; t
1
; : : : ; t
N
)
R
i
(b; t
1
; : : : ; t
N
) if and only if u
i
(a) + t
i
 u
i
(b) + t
i
.
Condition (1) says that allocations can be written as a product space of some
primitive allocations as well as a vector of private transfers. Note that the transfers are
freely disposable since
P
i
t
i
 0. Condition (2) states that preferences are representable
by a bounded quasi-linear utility function.
Let us consider social choice functions for which F (R) = (a; 0; : : : ; 0) for every
R 2 P. This is almost without loss of generality, since A
0
is arbitrary and if one wishes
to specify transfers that do not sum to 0, for instance specifying the sharing of the cost
of a public good as a function of R, then this can be included in the specication of
A
0
and the t
i
's can be thought of as additional transfers. The only loss of generality
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comes from condition (2) above, which implies that any transfers included in A
0
must
be bounded in size. This bound is needed for the implementing mechanism below to
function.
Theorem 8 (Moore and Repullo (1988)) Consider an environment with a nite num-
ber of states, quasi-linear preferences represented by utility functions that are bounded,
and N = 2. Any social choice function is implementable in subgame perfect equilib-
rium by an extensive game form of perfect information of nite length that has no
mixed strategy equilibria.
Although the theorem is stated for N = 2, the mechanism below can be extended
to N > 2 (see Moore and Repullo (1988) and Moore (1992) for details).
Theorem 8 is established through the mechanism pictured below. To understand
the mechanismwe note two points. First, the reader can easily check that for any quasi-
linear utility functions on A
0
, u
i
and v
i
that represent dierent preferences on A, we can
nd (a; t
i
) and (b; t
i
) such that u
i
(a)+ t
i
> u
i
(b)+ t
i
while v
i
(a)+ t
i
< v
i
(b)+ t
i
. Thus,
in the challenge phase of the mechanism pictured below, if agent i has announced v
i
and is challenged by the other agent who counters with v
i
, then such a pair is invoked.
Second, we can rewrite the social choice function to be a map from proles of bounded
utility functions on A
0
into allocations. So, the implemented social choice function can
be written to depend directly on the announcements of u
1
and u
2
.
[Insert Figure 6 here.]
The intuition behind the mechanism is straightforward. Suppose that the true
prole of preferences corresponds to (u
1
; u
2
). If 1 announces a false preference v
1
instead of u
1
, then individual 2 can challenge 1 and say u
1
. If 1 is challenged then
1 will end up paying a large ne no matter occurs in the sequel. 1 is then oered a
choice between the (a; t
i
) and (b; t
i
) that distinguish u
1
and v
1
. 1 will choose honestly,
as this is the end of the tree and 1 pays a ne regardless of the choice. If 1 chooses
(a; t
i
) then this indicates that 1 was not truthful in the rst stage, and so 2 is rewarded
by receiving the ne that 1 pays. If 1 chooses (b; t
i
) then this indicates that 2 was
not truthful ( either in challenging or in 2's announcement of u
1
) and then 2 also pays
a ne. This ne is suciently large (outweighing any implemented allocation) that 2
would like to challenge 1 if 1 lies, and not otherwise. The same reasoning applies to
the other section of the tree and so the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is
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for both individuals to announce utility functions that represent their true preferences
and so the correct outcome is implemented.
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While the results in this section have very optimistic implications, they come at
the expense of strong restrictions. Most importantly, one of the criticisms made of
virtual implementation - that it may not be credible to believe that bad outcomes will
stand - is also particularly important here. In both of the mechanisms above there
is some \bad" outcome (w in the undominated Nash implementation and a ne large
enough to outweigh all other considerations in the subgame perfect implementation)
and the mechanisms need to commit to these bad outcomes in order to sustain the
implementation. There are papers that address this shortcoming, which I discuss
below.
Finally, while the mechanisms above are relatively simple and intuitive, bounded,
and avoid mixed strategy equilibria; the mechanisms are still cumbersome in the sense
that they require announcements of preferences (or utility functions). Thus, although
they are well-behaved in a theoretical sense they are still far from \natural" in the sense
that they could be easily used in practice. So, although they are useful in delineating
the boundary of what can be implemented, we should want to push further to require
implementation by a mechanism with a simple or natural message space.
44
By adding
even more structure to the problem, one can obtain natural mechanisms with simple
action spaces. The tractability of specic environments for obtaining intuitive simple
mechanisms for implementation has been taken advantage of in allotment, bargaining,
voting, principle agent, and public goods environments in a series of papers.
45
The
implementing mechanisms that are obtained often have auction and voting like features
that make them very simple and natural.
One specic environment that has received a great deal of attention in the imple-
43
The niteness of the state space is important in guaranteeing existence of equilibrium, as it ensures
that there exists a well-dened best response of the \challenging" agent in the challenging subgames.
44
One approach to addressing the complexity of announcements of the mechanism is to examine
the dimensionality of the message spaces and look for mechanisms with minimal sized message spaces
and to establish lower bounds on what is necessary for implementation in various environments. For
explicit discussion of such considerations see the seminal paper of Mount and Reiter (1974), as well as
papers focussing on this issue in implementation such as Reichelstein and Reiter (1988), Saijo (1988),
and Hong and Page (1994).
45
See, for example, Glazer and Ma (1989), Jackson and Moulin (1992), Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1992), Dutta and Sen (1993), Glover (1993), Thomson (1994), Bag (1996, 1997), Jackson and Palfrey
(1998a), and Brusco and Jackson (1999).
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mentation literature is that of the exchange of private goods, and the implementability
of the constrained Walrasian correspondence.
46
Within this context one can examine
implementation with respect to certain message spaces. Can the constrained Walrasian
correspondence be implemented by mechanisms that only involve announcements of
prices and quantities or announcements of prices and allocations? These questions and
others are addressed in recent papers by Saijo, Tatamitani and Yamato (1996), Dutta,
Sen and Vohra (1995), and Sjostrom (1995b), which map out exactly what sorts of
message spaces are needed for Nash implementation of the Walrasian correspondence.
7 Other Topics and Open Questions
While the discussion of implementation theory above exposes the reader to some of
the results, techniques, and themes in the literature, there is a substantial portion of
the literature that I have not discussed. In this section I briey discuss some of the
issues that are addressed in the rest of the literature as well as some interesting open
problems.
Implementation under Incomplete Information
There is an extensive literature on implementation when individuals hold private in-
formation. Nash implementation has a natural analog in such settings which is referred
to as Bayesian implementation.
47
The reasoning behind the necessity of monotonic-
ity for Nash implementation extends to provide an analogous necessary condition for
Bayesian implementation that has been called Bayesian monotonicity in the literature
(e.g., see Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989a), and Jack-
son (1991)
48
). The incomplete information setting also introduces a necessary incentive
compatibility condition. As we know from the mechanism design literature, incentive
compatibility conditions can turn out to be quite restrictive, rendering many ecient
46
The large literature on this subject begins with Hurwicz (1972), and includes papers that pro-
vide increasingly well-behaved mechanisms worrying about auxiliary properties of the mechanism like
continuity of the outcome function, individual rationality, and balance out of equilibrium. See for
example, Schmeidler (1980), Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1995), Wettstein (1992), Nakamura
(1990), and Hurwicz (1996).
47
Bayesian implementation may be seen as a generalization of Nash implementation, as it reduces
to Nash implementation in situations where agents are symmetrically informed.
48
How one denes the setting and the Bayesian monotonicity condition is important for identifying
a condition which is both necessary and sucient for implementation. See Jackson (1991) for a
discussion of this point.
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and desirable social choice functions non-implementable.
49
While the necessity of an
incentive compatibility and a Bayesian monotonicity condition would be expected
50
,
the Bayesian setting also introduces new considerations that render the task of nd-
ing sucient conditions signicantly more complex than in the complete information
setting.
51
For instance, one cannot state a direct analog of Theorem 2 in a Bayesian en-
vironment. In particular, a no-veto style condition and Bayesian monotonicity need to
be carefully intertwined respecting the information structure, as discussed in Jackson
(1991).
52
While progress has been made in understanding the conditions that characterize
Bayesian implementation, the full implications of the Bayesian monotonicity condition
and the extent to which it may be satised are still less well understood. Palfrey and
Srivastava (1987, 1993) make signicant headway in showing that many analyses in
mechanism design and agency theory that use incentive compatibility and invoke the
revelation principle suer from multiple equilibrium problems and the identied social
choice functions fail to satisfy Bayesian monotonicity condition. They also show that in
environments with transferable utility the conditions for Bayesian implementation are
more easily satised.
53
A recent paper by Serrano and Vohra (1999) sheds more light on
the restrictiveness of Bayesian implementation by showing that Bayesian monotonicity
is essentially an ordinal condition, and so implemented social choice correspondences
must be constant across dierent cardinal representations of underlying ordinal pref-
erences. What is left open is a detailed understanding of what can be implemented in
non-transferable utility settings when we worry not only about incentive compatibility,
but also about full implementation and thus the multiple equilibrium problem and
Bayesian monotonicity.
While Nash implementation has an obvious generalization to environments with
incomplete information,
54
subgame perfect implementation does not have a unique
49
See Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) and (1993) for a number of examples in the context of Bayesian
implementation.
50
A closure condition which links play of dierent equilibrium strategies across the common knowl-
edge partition is also necessary.
51
There are other interesting dierences that arise in a Bayesian setting: Dutta and Sen (1994)
demonstrate a simple social choice function in a nite setting that requires a mechanism with innite
message spaces for implementation.
52
See Dutta and Sen (1991c) for more on the necessary and sucient conditions for Bayesian
implementation.
53
See also Matsushima (1993).
54
Other natural extensions of complete information implementation to incomplete information set-
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generalization, but instead several. This is due to the variety of alternative formu-
lations of sequential rationality under incomplete information. In particular, varying
assumptions about how individuals update beliefs o the equilibrium path results in
alternative solution concepts to be used in implementation. The two incomplete infor-
mation extensive form notions of implementation that have been analyzed are perfect
Bayesian implementation (Brusco (1995, 1997, 1998)) and implementation via sequen-
tial equilibrium (Baliga (1999) and Bergin and Sen (1998)). The interesting new aspect
that arises in these settings is that preference reversals can arise not only because of
dierences in the primitive underlying preferences, but also from the way in which
information is revealed in equilibrium through the extensive form. This is the focus of
the work of Bergin and Sen (1998). While various conditions for implementation have
been identied, the role of information revelation through an extensive form is not yet
fully understood.
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Ex Post Individual Rationality, Renegotiation, and Credibility
At several points I have mentioned that various forms of implementation rely on
the belief that the outcomes of the mechanism will be enforced, even if they are \bad"
from society's point of view ex-post. This can be problematic, to the extent that
the positive results depend on such outcomes being used by the mechanism and such
beliefs holding.
56
If, for example, a mechanism is constructed to assist bargainers in
reaching an ecient agreement, then it is questionable to assume that highly inecient
outcomes will be allowed to stand o (or on) the equilibrium path.
There are several papers that consider implementation in the face of individual
rationality and/or renegotiation on and o the equilibrium path. Ma, Moore and
Turnbull (1988) were the rst to point out the importance of imposing an individual
rationality constraint both in and out of equilibrium. They examined a principal-agent
model where the usual individual rationality constraint (imposed only on the equilib-
rium path) was replaced by an \opt-out," where each player had the ability to decline
the outcome of the mechanism and accept a status-quo outcome instead. Maskin and
Moore (1998) examined a more general implementation problem, and changed the opt-
tings have been analyzed as well, such as implementation in undominated Bayesian equilibrium (Pal-
frey and Srivastava (1989)), virtual Bayesian implementation (Duggan (1997a)), and virtual imple-
mentation in iteratively undominated strategies with incomplete information (Abreu and Matsushima
(1992).
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For instance, see Brusco (1998) for a puzzle on the necessity of multi-stage mechanisms.
56
See Hurwicz (1994) for a discussion of some other, related issues related to enforceability in
mechanism design.
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ing out to a possibility of renegotiation. This takes the point of view that instead
of settling for some outside option or status-quo, the individuals involved are likely
to renegotiate to some ecient outcome. Maskin and Moore considered implementa-
tion where any outcome of a mechanism that suggests a Pareto dominated allocation
is replaced by a Pareto ecient allocation according to an exogenous renegotiation
function.
57
Given any such renegotiation function, Maskin and Moore obtain charac-
terizations of Nash and subgame perfect implementation that have intuitive relation-
ships to the standard characterizations. Although these two papers provide insight
into ex-post individual rationality and renegotiation, much depends on the exogenous
specication of the outside options or renegotiation function.
One would like to model the process that occurs when players opt out, rather than
take as given a status quo or renegotiation function. Jackson and Palfrey (1998a) push
in this direction, in the context of a dynamic bargaining and matching model,
58
by
having a player be rematched with a new bargaining partner whenever he or she opts-
out of a prescribed alternative. They show that although such an endogenous individual
rationality constraint is compatible with eciency within individual matches, it can
be incompatible with eciency from society's point of view accounting for the overall
evolution of the market which requires specic exercise of the rematching option. In
other words, it can be impossible to implement the ecient rule in such a setting.
The above approaches are based on the idea that the individuals themselves are
not bound to the mechanism, but have the ability to opt out of the prescribed outcome
either to some status quo, renegotiated outcome, or replay of the mechanism. There
might be other contexts where such an opt-out can be prevented and the outcome can
be made legally binding. Nevertheless, one still has to worry about whether the planner
(or society at large) will let inecient outcomes stand ex-post. Studies which address
such \credibility", or the ability of the mechanism designer or planner to commit to
o-equilibrium-path outcomes that are known to be undesirable, include Chakravorti,
Corchon, and Wilkie (1992), Baliga, Corchon, and Sjostrom (1995) and Baliga and
Sjostrom (1995). These studies include the planner as a player in the mechanism,
59
in
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See Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1992) for a dierent approach. Their notion of \renegotiation-
proof" implementation requires that the possibility for renegotiation never arise on or o the equilib-
rium path.
58
See Jackson and Palfrey (1998b) for a unied approach to dealing with renegotiation, outside
options, and replay of the mechanism, in more abstract settings, with some applications to exchange
economies.
59
Including the planner as a player has an interesting theoretical byproduct: the planner is part of
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which case one can explicitly account for the planner's preferences and behavior with
regards to enforcing an outcome.
In all of the above work there are two forces at work. On the one hand, allowing
for movement away from ex-post undesirable outcomes can be improving just by itself
since truly undesirable outcomes are eliminated automatically. On the other hand,
this limits out of equilibrium threats that (as we saw in the last section) can play a
strong role in selecting which outcomes are implemented. Thus, although allowing for
players or the planner to alter outcomes builds in some minimal individual rationality
or eciency, it can come at the expense of selectivity of the mechanism. While the
above cited work makes progress in understanding enforceability and credibility issues,
a complete understanding of these issues requires full modeling (endogeneity) of the
process that occurs when an outcome is opted away from by the players or the planner.
Often this process may be situation specic, and so it should be worthwhile to analyze
this issue in a variety of specic environments, which is something this branch of the
literature is just beginning to do.
Mixed Strategies
We do not yet have a good understanding of what is Nash or subgame perfect
implementable when one accounts for mixed strategies (by mechanisms satisfying, say
the best response property). I discussed one approach to addressing this problem which
is to analyze specic environments where the additional structure can lead to simple
implementing mechanisms that avoid mixed strategy equilibria and other diculties
altogether. Such an approach has been very successful leading to some of the most
natural mechanisms for implementation to date. So it seems fruitful to simply break
the implementation analysis into many subproblems by analyzing specic settings and
developing a catalog of what is implementable setting by setting. However, a case can
still be made for attacking the problem head-on in the general setting. The reason
for complementing the setting-specic analyses with a general analysis is that it would
generate insight to the additional necessary (and sucient) conditions that come with
the consideration of mixed strategies. Given how tailored the analyses are in specic
environments, it is not clear that such an understanding will be obtained by piecing
together a catalog of results.
A number of possible head-on approaches suggest themselves, even simply with
respect to Nash implementation. One might ask what can be (exactly) Nash imple-
the equilibrium and can thus rule out undesired equilibria unilaterally.
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mented in nite environments by a nite mechanism that has no mixed strategies.
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Alternatively, one could allow for mixed strategies and consider implementing social
choice correspondences that map into lotteries and ask what is implementable then.
Robustness of Mechanisms
In order to push the theory towards applied use, one has to worry about how
sensitive a mechanism is to such obvious things as misspecication of the environment
or `irrational' behavior by the players.
Some work has been done on implementation allowing for variations in the behavior
of the individuals. Some of the rst work in this direction was on the implementation
of the Walrasian correspondence by mechanisms with a continuous outcome function
(e.g., see Postlewaite and Wettstein (1989)). Requiring continuity of a mechanism
results in an outcome close to the desired one if some players deviate slightly from
equilibrium strategies. More recent attention to robustness with respect to behavior
appears in studies of double implementation (e.g., see Yamato (1993, 1994ab)). Double
implementation requires implementation in more than one solution concept by the same
mechanism. When allowing for combinations such as Nash and strong equilibrium,
potentially unforeseen coalitional deviations are accounted for in implementation. One
can also ask for robustness with regards to behavior that is completely unpredictable
by some of the players. A new paper by Eliaz (1999) examines this sort of problem
asking that a mechanism rely only on a majority of the individuals (not knowing ex-
ante which majority it will be), and using a solution concept that requires behavior of
the players to be immune to arbitrary behavior by some subsets of other players.
While the work described above has examined robustness with regards to certain
aspects of the behavior of players, there is almost no study of mechanisms that are
immune to misspecications of the environment. The only study in this direction
that I am aware o is by Duggan and Roberts (1998), who study how continuity of
a mechanism can result in robustness with respect to small errors in misspecication,
due to corresponding upper-hemi continuity of equilibrium correspondences.
61
This
suggests that an intuitive notion of requiring some continuity of a mechanism in order
to guarantee some minimal robustness is well founded. Short of this, we are lacking
60
Again, Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) provide a good deal of insight into this question for
virtual implementation. The reason for considering the exact setting would be to loosen assumptions
on preferences and sensitivity to small probability events under the lotteries.
61
This holds provided one worries about mixed strategies, which Duggan and Roberts point to as
another reason for accounting for mixed strategies in implementation.
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even a basic understanding of the exact limitations that are imposed by requiring
implementation by mechanisms that are robust to misspecications of the domain of
preferences, beliefs, allocations, or even the number or role of various individuals in a
society.
Comparisons Across Solution Concepts
As we have developed a deeper understanding of what is implementable in a variety
of contexts and solution concepts, it has become clear that the choice of solution concept
used to model behavior has an important bearing on what is implementable. The
class of social choice correspondences that are implementable in undominated Nash or
subgame perfect equilibrium is signicantly larger than the class of Nash implementable
social choice correspondences . What is it about solution concepts (or assumptions on
individual behavior) that accounts for this dierence? Jackson and Srivastava (1996)
examine this issue in the context of a voting setting with a nite number of strictly
rankable alternatives. They point to dierences in consideration of o-equilibrium
path behavior as the critical factor the aects how much is implementable via dierent
solution concepts. While this works out cleanly in a voting context, it is still unkown
if the same is true more generally or even in other specic contexts like exchange
economies.
Tracing the characterizations of implementability back to assumptions concerning
individual behavior should be quite important. As modelers, we often consider a solu-
tion concept as an object of choice; but ultimately it boils down to to understand how
people behave in a given context. If we understand how variations in behavior tie back
to implementability, that we will eventually be well-equipped to make prescriptions in
various contexts. We are still short of such an understanding.
Repeated Implementation
Perhaps one of the most interesting and relevant, and still least studied, questions
in implementation theory is that of implementation in dynamic and repeated contexts.
We know from results on folk theorems, reputation, and learning (as well as various
experimental and applied studies), that behavior in repeated games can dier in impor-
tant ways from behavior in one-shot games. As most applications of implementation
are repeated ones, ranging from the design of voting procedure to markets, it is very
important that we understand how mechanisms perform when used repeatedly by the
same society. Work by Kalai and Ledyard (1998) is the only that I am aware of that
takes this perspective.
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They draw on intuition from the reputation and learning
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Work on implementation with extensive forms is of course dynamic. In some cases can involve
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literatures to note that if a mechanism designer is more patient than the underlying
population, then the society's characteristics can be teased out and learned over time.
Thus in the long run, a planner can avoid even incentive compatibility requirements in
a Bayesian setting. While this takes an important rst step towards modeling repeated
implementation, the question of what is generally implementable in repeated contexts
is wide open.
Choice of Mechanisms
The theory of implementation is agnostic on how a social choice correspondence
is selected for implementation or how a society might choose a mechanism. These
are critical questions in understanding the eventual outcome of the process. These
are also dicult questions to formulate, since at some point one has to make an ad
hoc assumption about the process of choice. Nonetheless one can ask for some sort
of consistency properties in decision making. Koray (1998) (see also Barbera and
Bevia (1998)), in a voting context, asks for consistency in that a social choice function
chosen by a society should be consistent with the manner in which it is selected.
That is, the selection of a social choice function can be formulated as a social choice
problem, and the social choice function selected should be one that would be selected
by itself. A clever formulation (see Koray (1998)) allows social choice functions to
be both the objects of choice and the methods of choice at the same time. Although
Koray's result is negative (he nds that only a dictatorial social choice function is
self-consistent), one can think of addressing such issues on restricted domains and
allowing for correspondences rather than functions. There are also alternative methods
of modeling choice of objectives and mechanisms by a society that can be investigated
in specic settings.
Another matter relating to the choice of mechanisms, is that an individual's pref-
erences and behavior may depend on the mechanism itself. Glazer and Rubinstein
(1998) present a context where individuals providing messages (\opinions") care ex-
plicitly about how their message ends up comparing to the ultimate social decision,
as they would like to have their recommendation match the social choice. This intro-
duces an added layer of feedback between the mechanism and equilibrium behavior,
that presents interesting and challenging issues for implementation theory. Such issues
dierent agents allocations being realized at dierent times for a variety or reasons such as information
revelation (as in Brusco (1997b)), random matching (as in Jackson and Palfrey (1998)), and dierent
arrival times (as in Brusco and Jackson (1999)). Nonetheless, these analyses are still one-shot in that
individuals cease to interact once an outcome is realized.
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are generally unexplored in the theory, and one can think of any number of examples
beyond the Glazer and Rubinstein context (for instance in principal-agent problems)
where they are important.
Testing Implementing Mechanisms
As the theory continues to generate mechanisms for implementation, we can begin to
evaluate and compare them through testing, simulation, and experiments. For instance
Chen (1997) compares behavior observed in a series of public goods mechanisms. She
attributes dierences in performance to supermodularity properties of the mechanisms,
which then helps us appreciate another feature that we might consider in designing
mechanisms. One can also test some of the canonical mechanisms directly as done by
Sefton and Yavas (1996). They ran experiments on the Abreu and Matsushima (1992a)
mechanism, and found relatively poor performance, which presents some formidable
hurdles for the theory. These just touch the surface of what can be explored, and one
can check whether various criticisms of unnatural features of mechanisms are supported
by experimental evidence.
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Similarly, simulations can be used to study the same issues,
as in Cabrales (1999). He studies adaptive learning by players in some of the canonical
mechanisms for implementation.
64
There is ample room for tests, simulations, and
experiments on mechanisms to add valuable guidance and insight to the theory of
implementation.
63
One interesting question is how a mechanism with an integer game would be played. Would
players play equilibrium strategies? Would they end up trying to announce high integers? (I am sure
that Caltech undergraduates could be very creative in announcing high integers.) How would behavior
depend on the social choice correspondence being implemented? Are they more likely to coordinate
on the equilibrium play when there is alignment of preferences?
64
The adaptive learning algorithm Cabrales analyzes has features that allow for complete random-
ization over best responses which can kick the process out of an integer game, and thus produce
convergence to equilibrium in Nash mechanisms. Ultimately, one would like a mechanism to perform
well under a variety of processes, and to oer fast convergence.
46
8 Bibliography
Abreu, D. and H. Matsushima (1992a), \Virtual Implementation in Iteratively
Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information," Econometrica, Vol. 60, pp.
993{1008.
Abreu, D. and H. Matsushima (1992b), \Virtual Implementation in Iteratively
Undominated Strategies II: Incomplete Information," mimeo.
Abreu, D. and H. Matsushima (1992c), \A Response to Glazer and Rosenthal,"
Econometrica, Vol. 60, pp. 1439{1442.
Abreu, D. and H. Matsushima (1994), \Exact Implementation," Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, Vol. 64, pp. 1-19.
Abreu, D. and A. Sen (1991), \Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibria," Econo-
metrica, Vol. 59, pp. 997{1022.
Abreu, D. and A. Sen (1990), \Subgame Perfect Implementation: A Necessary
and Almost Sucient Condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 50, pp.
285{299.
Allen, B. (1997), \Implementation Theory with Incomplete Information." In S.
Hart and A. Mas-Colell, Cooperation: Game Theoretic Approaches, Springer-
Verlag: Heidelberg.
Arya, A. and J. Glover (1995), \A Simple Forecasting Mechanism for Moral Hazard
Settings," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 66, pp. 507{521.
Arya, A., J. Glover, and J. Hughes (1997), \Implementing Coordinated Team
Play," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 74, pp. 218{232.
Arya, A., J. Glover, and U. Rajan (1998), \Implementation in Principal-Agent
Models of Adverse Selection," mimeo.
Arya, A., J. Glover, and R. Young (1995), \Virtual Implementation Separable
Bayesian Environments using Simple Mechanisms," Games and Economic Be-
havior, Vol. 9, pp. 127{138.
Bag, P.K. (1996), \Ecient Allocation of a \Pie": King Solomon's Dilemma,"Games
and Economic Behavior, Vol. 12, pp. 21{41.
47
Bag, P.K. (1997), \Public Goods Provision: Applying Jackson-Moulin Mechanisms
for Restricted Agent Characteristics," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 73,
pp. 460{472.
Bagnoli, M. and B. Lipman (1989), \Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implement-
ing the Core through Private Contributions," Review of Economic Studies, Vol.
56, pp. 583{601.
Baliga, S. (1999), \Implementation in Economic Environments with Incomplete In-
formation: The Use of Multi-Stage Games," Games and Economic Behavior,
Vol. 27, pp. 173{183.
Baliga, S. and S. Brusco (1996), \Collusion, Renegotiation, and Implementation,"
mimeo.
Baliga, S., L. Corchon, and T. Sjostrom (1997), \The Theory of Implementation
When the Planner is a Player," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 77, pp.
15{33.
Baliga, S. and T. Sjostrom (1995), \Interactive Implementation," Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, Vol. 27, pp. 38|63.
Baliga, S. and T. Sjostrom (1998), \Decentralization and Collusion," Journal of
Economic Theory, Vol. 83, pp. 196{232.
Bandyopadhyay, T. and L. Samuelson (1992), \Weakly Implementable Social
Choice Rules," Theory and Decision, Vol. 33, pp. 135{151.
Barbera, S. and B. Dutta (1982), \Implementation via Protective Equilibria,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 49{65.
Barbera, S. and C. Bevia (1998), \," mimeo: Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona.
Bergin, J. (1993), \On Some Recent Results in Incomplete Information Implementa-
tion," mimeo: Queen's University.
Bergin, J. and A. Sen (1996), \Implementation in Generic Environments," Social
Choice and Welfare, Vol. 13, pp. 467{478.
Bergin, J. and A. Sen (1998), \Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete In-
formation Environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 80, pp. 222{256.
48
Bergin, J. and J. Duggan (1999), \An Implementation Theoretic Approach to Non-
Cooperative Foundations," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 86, pp. 50{76.
Bernheim, D. and M. Whinston (1987), \Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium II:
Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 42, pp. 13{29.
Blume, L. and D. Easley (1990), \Implementation of Walrasian Expectations Equi-
libria," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 51, pp. 207{227.
Boylan, R. (1998), \Coalition-Proof Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory,
Vol. 82, pp. 132{143.
Brusco, S. (1995), \Perfect Bayesian Implementation," Economic Theory, Vol. 5, pp.
419{444.
Brusco, S. (1997a), \Implementing Action Proles when Agents Collude," Journal of
Economic Theory, Vol. 73, pp. 395{424.
Brusco, S. (1997b), \Implementation with Extensive Form Games: One Round of
Signaling is not Enough," forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Theory.
Brusco, S. (1998a), \Implementing Action Proles with Sequential Mechanisms,"
Review of Economic Design, Vol. 3, pp. 271{300.
Brusco, S. (1998b), \Unique Implementation of the Full Surplus Extraction Outcome
in Auctions with Correlated Types," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 80, pp.
185{200.
Brusco, S. (1998c), \Perfect Bayesian Implementation in Economic Environments,"
mimeo: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
Brusco, S. and M. Jackson (1999), \The Optimal Design of a Market," Journal of
Economic Theory, Vol. 87, pp. {.
Cabrales, A. (1999), \Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with
Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 86, pp. 159{184.
Chakravorti, B. (1991), \Strategy Space Reductions for Feasible Implementation of
Walrasian Performance," Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 8, pp. 235{246.
Chakravorti, B., L. Corchon, and S. Wilkie (1992), \Credible Implementation,"
forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior.
49
Chen, Y. (1997), \Dynamic Stability of Nash-Ecient Public Goods Mechanisms:
Reconciling Theory and Experiments," mimeo: University of Michigan.
Corchon, L. (1996), The Theory of Implementation of Socially Optimal Decisions in
Economis, McMillan: London.
Corchon, L. and C. Herrero (1995), \A Decent Proposal," mimeo: Universidad de
Alicante.
Corchon, L. and I. Ortuno-Ortin (1995), \Robust Implementation under Alterna-
tive Information Structures," Economic Design, Vol. 1, pp. 159{172.
Corchon, L. and S. Wilkie (1996), \Double Implementation of the Ratio Corre-
spondence by a Market Mechanism," Economic Design, Vol. 2, pp. 325{ 337.
Dagan, N., R. Serrano, and O. Volij (1999), \Feasible Implementation of Taxation
Methods," Review of Economic Design, Vol. 4, pp. 57{72.
Danilov, V. (1992), \Implementation via Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Vol. 60,
pp. 43{56.
Dasgupta, P., P. Hammond, and E. Maskin (1979), \The Implementation of
Social Choice Rules: some General Results on IncentiveCompatibility,"Review
of Economic Studies, Vol. 46, pp. 185{216.
Dasgupta, P. and E. Maskin (1997), \Notes on Ecient Auctions," mimeo Harvard
University.
Demski, J. and D. Sappington (1984), \Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple
Agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 33, pp. 152{171.
Duggan, J. (1995), \Sequentially Rational Implementation with Incomplete Informa-
tion," mimeo.
Duggan, J. (1997a), \Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Vol. 65, pp.
1175{1199.
Duggan, J. (1997b), \Implementing Social Welfare Optima when there is a Private
Good," mimeo: University of Rochester.
Duggan, J. (1998), \An Extensive Form Solution to the Adverse Selection Problem
in Principal/Multi-Agent Environments," Review of Economic Design, Vol. 3,
pp. 167{191.
50
Duggan, J. and J. Roberts (1997), \Robust Implementation," mimeo: University
of Rochester.
Dutta, B. and A. Sen (1991a), \Implementation Under Strong Equilibria: A Com-
plete Characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 20, pp.
49{68.
Dutta, B. and A. Sen (1991b), \Necessary and Sucient Conditions for 2{Person
Nash Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, pp. 121{129.
Dutta, B. and A. Sen (1991c), \Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium," mimeo:
Indian Statistical Institute.
Dutta, B. and A. Sen (1993), \Implementing Generalized Condorcet Social Choice
Functions via Backward Induction," Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 10, pp.
149{160.
Dutta, B. and A. Sen (1994), \The Necessity of Innite Mechanisms ," Journal of
Economic Theory, Vol. 64, pp. 130{141.
Dutta, B., A. Sen and R. Vohra (1995), \Nash Implementation Through Elemen-
tary Mechanisms in Economic Environments," Economic Design, Vol. 1, pp.
173{204.
Eliaz, K. (1999), \Fault Tolerant Implementation," mimeo: Tel Aviv University.
Gevers, L. (1986), \Walrasian Social Choice: Some Simple Axiomatic Approaches."
In W. Heller, et al., Social Choice and Public Decision Making: Essays in Honor
of Kenneth J. Arrow, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Gibbard, A. (1973), \Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econo-
metrica, Vol. 41, pp. 587{601.
Glazer, J. and A. Ma (1989), \Ecient Allocation of a \Prize": King Solomon's
Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 1, pp. 222{233.
Glazer, J. and M. Perry (1996), \Virtual Implementation in Backwards Induction,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 15, pp. 27{32.
Glazer, J. and R. Rosenthal (1992), \A Note on Abreu{Matsushima Mechanisms,"
Econometrica, Vol. 60, pp. 1435{1438.
51
Glazer, J. and A. Rubinstein (1998), \Motives and Implementation: On the Design
of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 79, pp.
157{173.
Glover, J. (1994), \A Simpler Mechanism that Stops Agents from Cheating," Journal
of Economic Theory, Vol. 62, pp. 221{229.
Hahn, G. and N. Yannelis (1995), \Coalitional Bayesian Nash Implementation in
Dierential Information Economies," mimeo: University of Illinois.
Harsanyi, J.C. (1967{68), \Games with Incomplete Information Played by `Bayesian'
Players," Management Science, Vol. 14, pp. 159{189, 320{334, 486{502.
Herrero, M. and S. Srivastava (1992), \Implementation via Backward Induction,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 56, pp. 70{88.
Hong, L. (1995), \Nash Implementation in Production Economies," Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, Vol. 5, pp. 401{417.
Hong, L. (1996), \Bayesian Implementation in Exchange Economies with State De-
pendent Feasible Sets and Private Information," Social Choice and Welfare,
Vol. 13, pp. 433-444.
Hong, L. (1998), \Feasible Bayesian Implementation with State Dependent Feasible
Sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 80, pp. 201{221.
Hong, L. and S. Page (1994), \Reducing Informational Costs in Endowment Mech-
anisms," Economic Design, Vol. 1, pp. 103{117.
Hurwicz, L. (1972), \On Informationally Decentralized Systems." In C.B. McGuire
and R. Radner, Decision and Organization, North Holland, Amsterdam.
Hurwicz, L. (1973), \The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation," American
Economic Review, Vol. 61, pp. 1{30.
Hurwicz, L. (1979), \Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations
at Nash Equilibrium Points," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 46, pp. 217{
225.
Hurwicz, L. (1994), \Economic Design, Adjustment Processes, Mechanisms and In-
stitutions," Economic Design, Vol. 1, pp. 1{14.
52
Hurwicz, L. (1996), \Feasible Balanced Outcome Functions Yielding Constrained
Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points in Economies
with Two Agents When the Designer Knows the Feasible Set," mimeo: Uni-
versity of Minnesota.
Hurwicz, L., E. Maskin, and A. Postlewaite (1995), \Feasible Nash Implementa-
tion of Social Choice Correspondences when the Designer does not Know En-
dowments or Production Sets." In J. Ledyard, The Economics of Information
Decentralization: Complexity, Eciency, and Stability, Kluwer, Amsterdam.
Jackson, M.O. (1991), \Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Vol. 59, pp. 461{
478.
Jackson, M.O. (1992), \Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A look at
Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59, pp. 757{775.
Jackson, M.O. and H. Moulin (1992), \Implementing a Public Project and Dis-
tributing its Cost," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 57, pp. 125{140.
Jackson, M.O. and T. Palfrey (1998a), \Eciency and Voluntary Implementation
in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining," Econometrica, Vol. 66, pp.
1353{1388.
Jackson, M.O. and T. Palfrey (1998b), \Voluntary Implementation," mimeo: Cal-
tech.
Jackson, M.O., T. Palfrey, and S. Srivastava (1994), \Undominated Nash Im-
plementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.
6, pp. 474{501.
Jackson, M.O. and S. Srivastava (1992), \On Two Person Nash Implementable
Social Choice Functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 9, pp. 263{264.
Jackson, M.O. and S. Srivastava (1996), \Characterizations of Game Theoretic
Solution Concepts which Lead to ImpossibilityTheorems," Review of Economic
Studies, Vol. 63, pp. 23{38.
Kalai, E. and J. Ledyard (1998), \Repeated Implementation," Journal of Economic
Theory, Vol. 83, pp. 308{317.
Kara, T. and T. Sonmez (1996), \Nash Implementation of Matching Rules," Journal
of Economic Theory, Vol. 68, pp. 425{439.
53
Kara, T. and T. Sonmez (1997), \Implementation of College Admissions Rules,"
Economic Theory, Vol. 9, pp. 197{218.
Koray, S. (1998), \Consistent Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow And Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorems," mimeo: Bilkent University.
Kwasnica, A.M. (1998), \Bayesian Implementable Ecient and Core Allocations,"
mimeo: Caltech.
Li, Q., Nakamura, S., and G. Tian (1995), \Nash Implementation of the Lindahl
Correspondence with Decreasing Returns to Scale Technologies," International
Economic Review, Vol. 36, pp. 37{52.
Ma, C. (1988), \Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents,"
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 55, pp. 555{572.
Ma, C., J. Moore, and S. Turnbull (1988), \Stopping Agents from `Cheating,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 46, pp. 355{72.
Maniquet, F. (1994), \On Equity and Implementation in Economic Environments,"
Ph.D. dissertation: Namur.
Mas{Colell, A. and X. Vives (1993), \Implementation in Economies with a Con-
tinuum of Agents," Review of Economic Studies.60613{629
Maskin (1985), \The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium." In L. Hurwicz,
D. Schmeidler, and H. Sonnenschein, Social Goals and Social Organization:
Essays in Honor of Elisha A. Pazner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Maskin, E. (1998), \Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic
Studies, Vol. 66, pp. 23{38.
Maskin, E. and J. Moore (1998), \Implementation with Renegotiation," Review of
Economic Studies.6639{56 Keywords:
Matsushima, H. (1988), \A New Approach to the Implementation Problem," Journal
of Economic Theory, Vol. 45, pp. 128{144.
Matsushima, H. (1993), \Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments," Journal of
Economic Theory, Vol. 59, pp. 107{121.
McKelvey, R. (1989), \Game Forms For Nash Implementation of General Social
Choice Correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 6, pp. 139{156.
54
Miyagawa, E. (1997), \Implementation of the Normalized Utilitarian Bargaining
Solution," mimeo: University of Rochester.
Miyamoto, H., T. Watanabe, and S. Mizuno (1990), \ Implementation in Ad-
missible Strategies," Technical Report No. 28, Department of Management
Science and Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology.
Mookherjee, D. and S. Reichelstein (1990), \Implementation via Augmented Rev-
elation Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 57, pp. 453{476.
Mookherjee, D. and S. Reichelstein (199?), \Dominant Strategy Implementa-
tion of Bayesian Incentive Compatible Allocation Rules," Journal of Economic
Theory, Vol. , pp. .
Moore, J. (1992), \Implementation, Contracts, and RenegotiationEnvironments with
Complete Information." In J.-J. Laont, Advances in Economic Theory, Cam-
bridge University Press: Cambridge.
Moore, J. and R. Repullo (1988), \Subgame Perfect Implementation," Economet-
rica, Vol. 56, pp. 1191{1220.
Moore, J. and R. Repullo (1990), \Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization,"
Econometrica, Vol. 58, pp. 1083{1100.
Moulin, H. (1980b), \Implementing Ecient, Anonymous and Neutral Social Choice
Functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 7, pp. 249{269.
Moulin, H. (1981), \Implementing Just and Ecient Decision making," Journal of
Public Economics, Vol. 16, pp. 193{213.
Moulin, H. (1982), \Non{Cooperative Implementation: A Survey of Recent Results,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 3, pp. 243{257.
Mount, K. and S. Reiter (1974), \The Informational Size of Message Spaces,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 8, pp. 161{192.
Muller, E. and M. Satterthwaite (1977), \On the Equivalence of Strong Positive
Association and Strategy{Proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 14,
pp. 412{418.
Myerson, R. and M. Satterthwaite (1983), \Ecient Mechanisms for Bilateral
Trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 29, pp. 265{281.
55
Nagahisa, R.I. (1994), \A Necessary and Sucient Condition for Walrasian Social
Choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 62, pp. 186{208.
Nakamura, S. (1988), \Feasible Nash Implementation of Competitive Equilibria in
an Economy with Externalities," mimeo: University of Minnesota.
Nakamura, S. (1990), \A Feasible Nash Implementation of Walrasian Equilibria in
the Two Agent Economy," Economics Letters, Vol. 34, pp. 5{ 9.
Nakamura, S. (1998), \Impossibility of Nash Implementation in Two Person Economies,"
Economic Design, Vol. 3, pp. 159{166.
Osana, H. (1997), \Nash-Implementation of the weak Pareto Choice Rule for Inde-
composable Environments," Review of Economic Design, Vol. 3, pp. 57{74.
Palfrey, T. (1990), \Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium: The Multiple Equilib-
rium Problem in Mechanism Design." In J.-J. Laont, Advances in Economic
Theory, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Palfrey, T. (1996), \Implementation Theory." In R. Aumann and S. Hart, Handbook
of Game Theory, Volume 3, .
Palfrey, T., and S. Srivastava (1986), \Private Information in Large Economies,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 39, pp. 34{58.
Palfrey, T., and S. Srivastava (1987), \On Bayesian Implementable Allocations,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 54, pp. 193{208.
Palfrey, T., and S. Srivastava (1989a), \Implementation with Incomplete Informa-
tion in Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Vol. 57, pp. 115{134.
Palfrey, T., and S. Srivastava (1989b), \Mechanism Design with Incomplete In-
formation: A Solution to the Implementation Problem," Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 97, pp. 668{691.
Palfrey, T., and S. Srivastava (1991), \Nash Implementation Using Undominated
Strategies," Econometrica, Vol. 59, pp. 479{502.
Palfrey, T., and S. Srivastava (1993), Bayesian Implementation, Harwood Aca-
demic Publishers.
Peleg, B. (1996a), \A Continuous Double Implementation of the Constrained Wal-
rasian Equilibrium," Economic Design, Vol. 2, pp. 89{97.
56
Perry, M. and P. Reny (1999), \A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 26, pp. 279{285.
Peleg, B. (1996b), \Double Implementation of the Lindahl Equilibrium by a Contin-
uous Mechanism," Economic Design, Vol. 2, pp. 311{324.
Piketty, T. (1993), \Implementation of First-Best Allocations via Generalized Tax
Schedules," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 61, pp. 23{41.
Postlewaite, A. (1985), \Implementation via Nash Equilibrium in Economic Envi-
ronments." In L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, and H. Sonnenschein, Social Goals
and Social Organization: Essays in Honor of Elisha A. Pazner, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Postlewaite, A. (1979), \Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Stud-
ies, Vol. 46, pp. 255{262.
Postlewaite, A. and D. Schmeidler (1986), \Implementation in Dierential Infor-
mation Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 39, pp. 14{33.
Postlewaite, A. and D. Wettstein (1989), \Continuous and Feasible Implementa-
tion," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 56, pp. 14{33.
Rai, A. (1997), \Ecient Audit Mechanisms to Target the Poor," Dissertation: Uni-
versity of Chicago.
Reichelstein S. and S. Reiter (1988), \Game Forms with Minimal Strategy Spaces,"
Econometrica, Vol. 56, pp. 661{692.
Repullo, R. (1987), \A Simple Proof of Maskin's Theorem on Nash Implementation,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 4, pp. 39{42.
Rubinstein, A. and A. Wolinsky (1992), \Renegotiation-Proof Implementation
and Time Preferences," American Economic Review, Vol. , pp. .
Saglam, I. (1997), \A Note on Jackson's Theorems in Bayesian Implementation,"
mimeo: Bilkent University.
Saijo, T. (1987), \On Constant Maskin-Monotonic Social Choice Functions," Journal
of Economic Theory, Vol. 42, pp. 382{386.
Saijo, T. (1988), \Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sucient Condi-
tions for Nash Implementation," Econometrica, Vol. 56, pp. 693{700.
57
Saijo T., Y. Tatimatani, and T. Yamato (1996), \Toward Natural Implementa-
tion," International Economic Review, Vol. 37, pp. 949{980.
Schmeidler, D. (1980), \Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions," Econo-
metrica, Vol. 48, pp. 1585{1593.
Sefton, M. and A. Yavas (1996), \Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms: Experimental
Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 16, pp. 280{302.
Sen, A. (1995), \The Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Social Choice
Correspondences: A General Formulation and a Limit Result," Social Choice
and Welfare, Vol. 12, pp. 277{292.
Serrano, R. (1993), \Non-Cooperative Implementation of the Nucleolus- The 3-Player
Case," International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 22, pp. 345{ 357.
Serrano, R. (1995), \A Market to Implement the Core," Journal of Economic Theory,
Vol. 67, pp. 285{294.
Serrano, R. (1997), \A Comment on the Nash Program and the Theory of Imple-
mentation," Economics Letters, Vol. 55, pp. 203{208.
Serrano, R., and R. Vohra (1997), \Non-Cooperative Implementation of the Core,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 14, pp. 513{525.
Serrano, R. and R. Vohra (1999), \On the Impossibility of Implementation under
Incomplete Information," mimeo: Brown University.
Sertel, M. (1994), \Manipulating Lindahl Equilibrium via Endowments," Economics
Letters, Vol. 46, pp. 167{171.
Shin, S. and S. Suh (1996), \AMechanism Implementing the Stable Rule inMarriage
Problems," Economics Letters, Vol. 51, pp. 169{176.
Sjostrom, T. (1991), \On the Necessary and Sucient Conditions for Nash Imple-
mentation," Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 8, pp. 333{340.
Sjostrom, T. (1993), \Implementation in Perfect Equilibrium," Social Choice and
Welfare, Vol. 10, pp. 97{106.
Sjostrom, T. (1994), \Implementation in Undominated Nash Equilibria without In-
teger Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 6, pp. 502{511.
58
Sjostrom, T. (1995a), \Implementation in Teams," Economic Design, Vol. 1, pp.
327{342.
Sjostrom, T. (1995b), \Implementation by Demand Mechanisms," Economic Design,
Vol. 1, pp. 343{354.
Sjostrom, T. (1996), \Credibility and Renegotiation of Outcome Functions in Imple-
mentation," Japanese Economic Review , Vol. 47, pp. 157{169.
Sjostrom, T. (1999), \ Undominated Nash Implementation with Collusion and Rene-
gotiation," Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 26, pp. 337{352.
Suh, S.-C. (1995), \A Mechanism Implementing the Proportional Solution," Eco-
nomic Design, Vol. 1, pp. 301{317.
Suh, S.-C. (1997a), \An Algorithm Checking Strong Nash Implementability," Journal
of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 109{122.
Suh, S.-C. (1997b), \Games Implementing the Stable Rule of Marriage Problems in
Strong Nash Equilibria," mimeo: University of Windsor.
Tatamitani, Y. (1991), \Double Implementation in Nash and Undominated Nash
Equilibria in Social Choice Environments," mimeo: University of Tsukuba.
Thomson, W. (1979), \Maximin Strategies and Elicitation of Preferences." In J.-J.
Laont, Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, North Holland: Amster-
dam.
Thomson, W. (1996), \Concepts of Implementation," Japanese Economic Review,
Vol. 47, pp. 133{143.
Thomson, W. (1994), \Divide and Permute and the Implementation of Solutions to
the Problem of Fair Division ," mimeo: University of Rochester.
Thomson, W. (1999), \Monotonic Extensions on Economic Domains," Review of
Economic Design, Vol. 4, pp. 13{34.
Tian, G. (1989), \Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued,
Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 56,
pp. 613{621.
59
Tian, G. (1990), \Completely Feasible Continuous Implementation of the Lindahl
Correspondence with a Message Space of Minimal Dimensions," Journal of
Economic Theory, Vol. 51, pp. 443{452.
Tian, G. (1991), \Implementation of the Lindahl Allocations with Nontotal-Nontransitive
Preferences," Journal of Public Economis, Vol. 46, pp. 247{ 259.
Tian, G. (1993), \Implementing Lindahl Allocations by a Withholding Mechanism,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 22, pp. 169{179.
Tian, G. (1994), \Implementation of Linear Cost Share Equilibrium Allocations,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 64, pp. 568{584.
Tian, G. (1996), \Continuous and Feasible Implementation of Rational Expectations
Lindahl Allocations," Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 16, pp. 135{151.
Tian, G. (1999), \Bayesian Implementation in Exchange Economies with State De-
pendent Preferences and Feasible Sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 16,
pp. 99{120.
Tian, G. and Q. Li (1991), \Completely Feasible and Continuous Implementation of
the Lindahl Correspondence with any Number of Goods," Mathematical Social
Sciences, Vol. 21, pp. 67{79.
Tian, G. and Q. Li (1994), \An Implementable and Informational Ecient State-
Ownership System with Variable Returns," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.
64, pp. 286{297.
Tian, G. and Q. Li (1995), \On Nash-Implementation in the Presence of Withhold-
ing," Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 9, pp. 222{233.
Trockel, W. (1998), \An Exact Implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution
in Dominant Strategies." In Y. Abramovich, E. Avgerinos, and N. Yanellis,
Functional Analysis and Economic Theory, Springer-Verlag: Heidelberg.
van Damme, E. (1987), Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilbria, Springer Verlag.
Wettstein, D. (1990), \Continuous Implementation of Constrained Rational Expec-
tations Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 52, pp. 208{222.
Wettstein, D. (1992), \Continuous Implementation in Economies with Incomplete
Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 4, pp. 463{ 483.
60
Williams, S. (1984), \Sucient Conditions for Nash Implementation," mimeo.
Williams, S. (1986), \Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mech-
anism Design," Econometrica, Vol. 54, pp. 139{151.
Yamato, T. (1992), \On Nash Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 4, pp. 484{492.
Yamato, T. (1993), \Double Implementation in Nash and Undominated Nash Equi-
libria," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 59, pp. 311{323.
Yamato, T. (1994), \Equivalence of Nash Implementability and Robust Implementabil-
ity with Incomplete Information," Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 11, pp.
289{303.
Yamato, T. (1994), \Nash Implementability and Double Implementation: Equiva-
lence Theorems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. , pp. .
61
